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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Cuban-Soviet relations from 1959 
to the present and demonstrates that there has been no 
consistent "move toward homogeneity of Cuban and Soviet 
^foreign policy aims as a result of Soviet manipulation of 
Cuba. Although the two nations have cooperated and 
supported one another on several occasions, there have also 
been many occasions when Cuban and Soviet objectives and 
ideologies were in direct conflict, especially concerning 
support for armed communist struggle in the Third World and 
the need for significant economic restructuring in communist 
nations. Citing specific examples of Cuba's autonomous 
foreign policy and divergence of Cuban and Soviet foreign 
policy goals, this thesis argues against popular theories 
which maintain that Soviet influence and economic control 
over Cuba has allowed the Soviet Union to dominate Cuban 
foreign policy.
This thesis divides the evolution of Cuban-Soviet 
relations into five distinct eras. Chapter one examines 
relations from Castro's victory in 1959 to Khrushchev's fall 
from power in 1964. Chapter two explores the breakdown of 
Cuban-Soviet relations from 1964 to the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Chapter three examines renewed 
accommodation in Cuban-Soviet relations beginning with 
Castro's support of the Soviet invasion and continued 
improvement through the middle of the 1970s as a result of 
shared foreign policy concerns. Chapter four reviews Cuban- 
Soviet relations from 1975 to the beginning of Gorbachev's 
rule in 1985. Chapter five examines the dramatic changes in 
Cuban-Soviet relations which have taken place during the 
first six years of Mikhail Gorbachev's administration, 
particularly the sweeping reforms that Gorbachev has 
proposed for Soviet economic and foreign policies. These 
changes threaten to destroy the Cuban-Soviet rapprochement 
that was built over the past two and a half decades. The 
chapter will examine changes in Soviet strategy, 
particularly those changes which were directly influenced by 
the Soviet Union's relationship with Cuba, Castro's reaction 
to these changes, and possible directions for the future of 
Cuban-Soviet relations.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBA AND 
THE SOVIET UNION: 1959 - 1990
Introduction
Since Lenin consolidated power in the Soviet Union in 
the 1920s, Soviet foreign policy has followed a two-track 
course of establishing state-to-state relations while also 
emphasizing support for revolution and native communist 
parties.1 Although state-to-state relations are a standard 
feature of any nation's foreign policy, support for native 
communist parties and the promotion of revolutions of 
national liberation are features which were, in the 1920s, 
unique to Soviet foreign policy. These antagonistic 
policies frequently undermined the Soviet leadership's 
ability to establish normal relations with many nations in 
Europe and throughout the world. Although more recent 
Soviet leaders have de-emphasized official Soviet support 
for international communist parties and Marxist revolutions 
since they impede the Soviet Union's drive toward peaceful 
coexistence with other nations, the Soviet Constitution of 
1977 clearly affirmed, "The USSR's foreign policy is aimed 
at ensuring favorable international conditions for building 
communism in the USSR, protecting the Soviet Union's state
1 Eusebio Mujal-Leon, The USSR and Latin America 
(Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xvi.
2
3interests, strengthening the positions of world socialism, 
supporting the peoples' struggle for national liberation and 
social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving 
general and complete disarmament, and consistently 
implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states 
with different social systems."2
Despite the relative rigidity of Soviet domestic 
politics, Soviet foreign policy has demonstrated the ability 
to adapt to the ever-changing conditions underlying 
relations with other nations. Soviet leaders since Lenin 
have stressed the importance of an organic foreign policy 
able to adjust to the changing nature of the international 
system, a system which has distinctive characteristics 
shaped by the goals and actions of competing socioeconomic 
systems and by the "correlation of forces" among nations.3 
However, it was not until the end of World War II that the 
Soviet leadership saw any realistic possibility of bringing 
about international socialist revolutions without provoking 
dangerous retaliations from the capitalist powers. Although 
Marxism-Leninism recognizes the importance of revolution,, 
particularly revolution resulting from class conflict, it
2 From "The Fundamental Law of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics," as quoted in Robert Sharlet, The New 
Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text (Brunswick, 
OH: King's Court Communications, 1978), 85.
3 Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, eds., Soviet 
Foreign Policy in A Changing World (New York, NY: Aldine de 
Gruyter, 1986), xvii.
manctetes^that-tensionsshould^bekept within limits and not 
be permitted to involve Soviet foreign policy in high-risk 
military conflicts or in "adventurist” undertakings,.4 As a 
result, Stalin sought to consolidate within the Soviet camp 
only those nations which the United States and Britain 
recognized as falling within the Soviet sphere. He avoided 
any direct Soviet interference in Western Europe and 
immediately sought to shield Eastern Europe behind a veil of 
secrecy in order to conceal the vulnerability and 
instability of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. 
The consolidation of Eastern European nations marked the 
Soviet Union*s first move toward establishing a community of 
communist nations.
Whereas the Soviet Union has been opposed to engaging 
in armed conflict with the United States and Western Europe, 
it was quick to resort to military intervention to prevent 
the withdrawal of Eastern European nations from the Soviet 
camp. Moscow authorized the use of military intervention in 
East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 
1968, as well as "indirect intervention" in Poland in 
1981.5 Malcom Macintosh argues that Soviet interests in 
Eastern Europe were founded on military and security motives
4 Michael Curtis, Introduction to Comparative 
Politics. (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 
382.
5 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Soviet Policy Toward Eastern 
Europe: Interests, Instruments and Trends," from R. Laird 
and E. Hoffman, 531.
5backed by few, if any, ideological considerations.6 
Eastern Europe created a buffer zone between the Soviet 
Union and Western Europe, provided space for Soviet military 
deployment and maneuvers away from Soviet soil, thereby 
enabling Moscow to launch a lightning offensive against 
NATO, and supplied the Soviet military with a potential 
reserve of troops in the event of a large-scale armed 
conflict.
In addition, Communist Eastern Europe proved an 
effective diplomatic bloc which customarily supported Soviet 
initiatives and positions in the United Nations and other 
international organizations. In order to reward the 
allegiance of Eastern European nations and ensure their 
continued loyalty, the Soviet Union developed a complex 
system of economic interdependence which generally 
benefitted the client state. Although the early economic 
relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
favored the Soviets, this trend was reversed in the years 
following Stalin's death. From the 1960s up until the late 
1980s, the Soviet Union was paying an increasingly steep 
price to maintain its domination over Eastern Europe and 
other client states.7 This use of economic assistance and
6 Malcom Macintosh, "Military Considerations in
Soviet-East European Relations," in Karen Dawisha, ed., 
Soviet-East European Dilemmas (New York, NY: Holmes and 
Meier, 1981), 136-137.
7 Ibid.
6trade subsidies proved effective in attracting 
underdeveloped nations to the Soviet camp and establishing 
Soviet influence within those nations.
By the 1950s the Soviet Union had begun to see itself 
as a world power and wanted to increase its influence around 
the globe. David Albright argues that the Soviet leadership 
realized that "a superpower does not automatically qualify 
as a global power ... such a power must be able to 
demonstrate global reach."8 Thus, Moscow realized the 
importance of creating allies among Third World nations in 
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The 
Korean War highlighted the ideological struggle being played 
out in the Third World. The Soviets characterized the 
competition between capitalism and communism as a zero-sum 
game, in which advances of one side represented losses for 
the other. Consequently, the Soviets sought to limit 
Western influence in the Third World while firmly 
establishing their own presence in underdeveloped nations.9
The Soviet Union faced an additional opponent in the 
Third World —  the Peoples Republic of China. A rift 
developed between the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s. 
Although the two nations had experienced regular clashes as 
a result of an enduring disagreement over borders, the
8 David E. Albright, "Latin America in Soviet Third 
World Strategy: The Political Dimensions," in E. Mujal-Leon, 
12.
9 Ibid., 15.
7confrontation worsened when Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong 
engaged in an ideological rivalry. Khrushchev sought to 
liberalize and reform Soviet communism following the death 
of Stalin. Mao, who was trying to strengthen China*s 
ideological commitment to communism, openly opposed 
Khrushchev's reforms. The dispute carried over into the 
international arena, where it developed into a struggle 
between the two nations to determine which ideology was to 
guide the formulation of international communist policy, 
particularly regarding communist movements in the Third 
World.10
China had limited success in attracting Third World 
allies with its promise of military support for communist 
revolution. Most underdeveloped nations opted for the 
economic support offered by the Soviets. However, in 
reaction to expanding Soviet influence in Africa and Latin 
America throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China abandoned its 
earlier effort to cloak itself in the mantle of a militant 
revolutionary power and attempted to highlight its 
commitment to economic development.11 In 1982 the General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party asserted that 
"socialist China belongs to the Third World for it has 
experienced the same sufferings of most other Third World
10 Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Toward China," in R. 
Laird and E. Hoffman, 672.
11 D. Albright, 17.
8countries, and...is faced with similar problems and 
tasks."12 Yet despite its attempts to achieve broader 
appeal among underdeveloped nations, China's influence 
remained restricted to Asia.
Although China never proved to be a major threat to 
Soviet influence in the Third World, the United States did. 
The United States developed considerable interests in Asia 
and the Middle East, but its most uncontested sphere of 
influence was Latin America. Indeed, Latin America, as the 
Third World region furthest from the Soviet Union and 
nearest to the United States, has traditionally been a low 
priority area for the Soviet Union. Moscow approached any 
initiatives in the region with considerable restraint. This 
was due, in part, to the unwillingness of Soviet leaders to 
jeopardize Soviet-American relations by instituting Soviet 
ties with Latin American communist parties. Americans had 
come to accept the existence of a communist party in the 
United States, especially since it was relatively obscure 
and exercised no influence over American policy. However, 
an actual communist government in the Western hemisphere was 
not welcome. As a result, the Soviet Union refused to offer 
overt support to potentially successful communist parties in 
the region. For example, when the Mexican Communist Party
12 Hu Yaobang, "Report to the Twelfth Chinese 
Communist Party Congress, September 1982," as recorded in 
"Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist 
Modernization," Beiiina Review (September 13, 1982), 29.
9had the opportunity to achieve some degree of political 
influence in Mexico in 1933, the Soviets offered no 
assistance knowing that it would create tensions with the 
United States.13 Even the Soviet press, the mouthpiece for 
political propaganda of international communism, failed to 
report fully on the activities of Latin American communists.
Soviet neglect of Latin America continued during the 
reign of Stalin, who had little interest in establishing 
diplomatic and economic relations with the remote nations of 
Latin America.14 However, as the Soviets began to seek 
strategic parity with the United States in the 1950s and 
Khrushchev succeeded Stalin as chairman of the CPSU, Soviet 
leaders began to reassess the importance of the region to 
Soviet Cold War strategy.15 Moscow's attempts to establish 
relations with Latin American nations proved slow and 
difficult. By 1960, the Soviets had established ties with 
only three Latin American governments, in Brazil, Argentina, 
and Cuba.
Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military activity in 
the region expanded dramatically throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. Relying heavily on Cuba as an ally and, frequently,
13 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet
Foreign Policy. 1917-1973 (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1974), 645.
14 Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America: 
1959-1987 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 5.
15 Ibid.
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a front for Soviet expansionism in the region, the Soviets 
initiated contacts with several Latin American nations.
Many of these nations recognized the immediate benefits of 
relations with the Soviet Union since even a low-key 
relationship could be economically and politically 
profitable in an international system dominated by the two 
superpowers.16 In exchange, the Soviet Union advocated the 
participation of communist parties and other leftist parties 
in the native governments. Where successfully integrated, 
as in Mexico and eventually Argentina and Brazil, communist 
parties helped to ensure strong relations between the Soviet 
Union and Latin American nations. As a result of improved 
relations with Latin American democracies, the Soviet Union 
was afforded a legitimate voice in the affairs of the region 
and the Third World.
Mark Katz and other scholars have argued that Soviet 
support for native communist parties was the most effective 
means for securing Soviet influence in Latin America and the 
Third World.17 He asserts that the creation of a 
disciplined vanguard party along the lines of Marxist- 
Leninist precepts fulfills the need for a strong centralized 
government found in many Latin American societies. The 
communists, when properly organized and established, can
16 William H. Luers, "The Soviets and Latin America," 
The Washington Quarterly. 7, no. 1 (Winter 1984), 9.
17 See Mark Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military 
Thought (London, England: Croom Helm, 1982).
11
replace military and oligarchical governments throughout the 
Third World. Supporters of this perspective concede that 
when a communist regime replaces a military regime, the 
military may remain closely tied to the new communist 
government. The military helps to ensure the survival of 
the communist government until mass support for the party 
can be established. Such was the case with Cuba, the Soviet 
Union*s most visible and enduring ally in Latin America.
This alliance cost the Soviets dearly. By 1989 the 
Soviet Union was spending an average of $50 billion per 
annum to secure Cuban friendship, Cuban-Soviet trade, and 
Soviet military installations on the island.18 This amount 
was guaranteed through direct Soviet economic assistance to 
Cuba, Soviet subsidies of Cuban exports, and Soviet military 
shipments to Cuba. In order for the Soviet Union to agree 
to such a high cost for relations with a small island 
nation, the Soviets must have expected meaningful benefits 
in return.
In the early 1960s, the Soviets were most concerned 
with establishincL^stratecric-parity-, with the United States. 
Cuba was the first nation in the region that publicly sought 
Soviet cooperation in liberating itself from American 
dominance. Although Khrushchev was attentive to the 
maintenance of stable U.S.-Soviet relations, he decided to
18 George Black, "Fidel Holds Fast,” The Nation 
(January 1, 1990), 5.
12
take advantage of the inherent opportunities to be derived 
from positive relations with Cuba. The island occupied the 
perfect location for maintaining a constant threat to the 
United States and its hegemony in the region. Castro's 
position seemed stable and his celebrated charisma ensured 
popular support for the regime. The revolutionary 
government was vocally "anti-imperialist” from the beginning 
and later claimed a strong commitment to "internationalist 
duty and solidarity."19 Each of these qualities encouraged 
Soviet interest in Cuba.
Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders saw Cuba as 
fulfilling three significant roles: first, as an anti­
imperialist sounding_board committed to the erosion of the 
United States' historical predominance in the region? 
second, as a base for support of future communist movements 
in Latin America; and third, as the Soviet Union's primary 
spokesman for and contact with other Third World nations.20 
As the relationship progressed, the Soviet Union began 
initiating military agreements with Cuba which were intended 
to strengthen the Soviet threat to American security along 
the southern coast of the United States. The Soviets also 
recognized Cuba as an eager ally in military operations
19 W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: 
Interests and Influences (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 
1985), 191-192.
20 Timothy Ashby, The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow's 
Caribbean Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 
xi.
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throughout the Third World. But it was Cuba's role as a 
source of antagonism for the United States and a source Of 
influence in the Third World that the Soviets most wanted to 
maintain. However, the Soviets were committed to 
maintaining a strong alliance with Cuba only as long as it 
did not jeopardize their fundamental relationship With the 
United States* Soviet foreign policy stressed the primacy 
of peaceful coexistence with the United States and its 
Western European allies. Therefore, any relationship that 
threatened to undermine this peace was unacceptable to the 
Soviet leadership.
Immediately following Fidel Castro's revolutionary 
victory over Fulgencio Batista it was not evident in which 
direction Castro was planning to take Cuba. Castro 
inherited an island whose fate had been closely guarded, 
since 1898 by the United States to maintain regional 
stability and protect extensive American business interests 
on the island.21 Cuba's foreign policy was also dominated 
by the United States. American hegemony made it difficult 
for Batista to establish strong relations with most other
21 The United States won Cuba's independence from the 
Spanish in 1898. In 1989, a treaty between Spain and the 
United States made the island an independent republic under 
U.S. protection. The U.S. occupation, which ended in 1902, 
introduced large-scale American investment in Cuba.From 1906 
to 1909 invoked the Platt Amendment, amendments to the Cuban 
constitution that gave the United States the right to 
intervene in Cuba's domestic affairs. The United States 
also intervened in Cuban internal affairs in 1912, 1917, and 
1933 to restore order and protect American interests.
14
nations, particularly with nations unfriendly to the United 
States. Most of Cuba's relations were based upon the sale 
of sugar, the island's primary export. Cuba sold sugar to 
the United States, most Latin American nations, several 
European nations, and the Soviet Union.22
Castro's primary goals upon seizing power from the 
U.S.-backed dictator were to ensure his government's and the 
island's security. Edward Gonzalez identifies four "minimum 
interests" which guided Castro's early actions as head of 
the revolutionary government.23 First, Castro sought to 
enhance his political power base in Cuba by placing loyal 
supporters in key governmental positions and gaining the 
support of the military and major political parties.
Second, he worked to assure his regime's security vis-a-vis 
the United States. Because of his fear of U.S. intervention 
against his government, Castro encouraged Soviet strategic 
interest in the region. Third, Castro tried to develop 
Cuba's role as an independent actor, despite its close 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Although Castro 
welcomed opportunities to support Soviet foreign policy 
strategy, he was not willing to blindly follow nor applaud 
Soviet policies which proved contrary to Cuba's own
22 Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
5.
23 Edward Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet Challenge in 
the Caribbean Basin," Orbis (Spring 1985), 75.
15
interests. And fourth, Castro wanted to obtain sufficient 
levels of economic assistance to promote the island's 
development. Castro worked hard to ensure sufficient Soviet 
financial assistance to furnish Cubans with an elevated 
standard of living and high education and literacy rates as 
compared to those of other Third World nations.
Gonzalez also argues that the relationship that 
developed between Cuba and the Soviet Union has encouraged 
Castro to establish a "maximalist strategy" of foreign 
policy. Contained in this strategy are nationalist foreign 
policy objectives which encouraged Castro to establish 
strong ties with the Soviet Union to help secure these 
objectives. They include: promoting the Third World 
struggle against "imperialism" in order to erode the global 
power of the United States; extending Cuba's influence in 
the Third World through an active diplomatic, political, 
technical, and military-security presence in the region; 
promoting the rise of radical-left or Marxist-Leninist 
regimes in the Caribbean Basin through armed struggle in 
order to form a core of radical states closely aligned with 
Cuba; and increasing Cuba's power potential, politically and 
militarily, through the infusion of higher levels of Soviet 
military and economic assistance.24 As Gonzalez points 
out, these objectives could only be achieved through active 
political, military, and economic collaboration with the
24 Ibid.
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Soviet Union.
There are several theories of Cuban-Soviet relations 
which argue that Castro's Cuba is merely a proxy of Soviet 
foreign policy. Both the "Surrogate Thesis of Cuban 
Globalism"25 and later the "Sovietization of Cuba Thesis"26 
argue that Cuban dependency on Soviet economic and military 
assistance has eroded Castro's ability to pursue an 
independent foreign policy. Many scholars have argued that 
the Soviet Union dictates Cuban domestic and foreign policy 
and slowly has been transforming Cuba into a society more 
compatible with Soviet society. While it is true that " ,
f
Castro has become dependent on direct Soviet assistance and 
favorable trade agreements with the Soviet Union, he has 
proven himself an independent actor in international 
affairs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Cuban-Soviet 
relations from 1959 to the present and show that there has 
been no consistent move toward homogeneity of Cuban and 
Soviet foreign policy aims as a result of Soviet 
manipulation of Cuba. Although the two nations have 
cooperated and supported one another on several occasions,
25 See James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of 
Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to 
Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), 63-71.
26 See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s 
(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1974) for 
a detailed explanation of the theory.
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there have also been many incidents when Cuban and Soviet 
objectives and ideologies were in direct conflict, 
especially concerning support for armed communist struggle 
in the Third World. Most recently, Castro has vocally 
opposed Gorbachev's call for economic reforms and Soviet 
reevaluation of foreign policy objectives.
This paper divides the evolution of Cuban-Soviet 
relations into five distinct eras. Chapter one examines 
relations from Castro's victory in 1959 to Khrushchev's fall 
from power in 1964. During this period both nations worked 
to establish positive economic and diplomatic relations and 
to define particular goals. Chapter two explores the 
breakdown of Cuban-Soviet relations from 1964 to 1968.
During this period the Soviet Union sought improved 
relations with the United States and moved away from direct 
support for armed struggle in the Third World. Castro, 
however, desired a stronger communist presence in Third 
World activities and criticized the Soviet Union for its 
acquiescence and lack of interest in Third World affairs. 
Chapter three examines renewed accommodation in Cuban-Soviet 
relations beginning with Castro's support of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and continued improvement 
through the middle of the 1970s. This period was marked by 
renewed foreign policy agreement between the two nations and 
a build-up of Soviet military installations on Cuba.
Chapter four reviews Cuban-Soviet relations from 1975 to
18
1985. During this period, Cuban and Soviet foreign policy 
converged and resulted in active support for national 
liberation movements in Africa and Latin America. It was 
during these years that Castro's role in determining Cuban- 
Soviet cooperation was most evident. Chapter five examines 
the dramatic changes in Cuban-Soviet relations which have 
taken place during the first five years of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's rule in the Soviet Union. The sweeping reforms 
that Gorbachev has proposed for Soviet economic and foreign 
policies threaten to destroy the Cuban-Soviet rapprochement 
that was built over the past two and a half decades. The 
chapter will examine changes in Soviet strategy, Castro's 
reaction to these changes, and possible directions for the 
future of Cuban-Soviet relations.
Chapter One
The Formation of Cuban-Soviet Ties: 1959-1964
Following World War II, the Soviets were eager to 
encourage communist revolutions and establish influential 
footholds in many regions of the Third World, particularly 
in Asia and the Middle East. The political elite during 
Nikita Khrushchevvs regime sought to couple the technical, 
economic, and military strength of the Soviet Union with the 
desire of many African and Asian states to become 
independent nations. Khrushchev appeared convinced that 
these nations would eagerly adopt Soviet-style communism in 
exchange for Soviet aid and military assistance, thereby 
spreading communist doctrine and expanding Soviet 
influence.27 Latin America, however, was generally 
disregarded by Khrushchev as a potential site for communist 
revolution since most regimes in the region were either 
democratic, supported by right-wing military officers, or 
securely under the influence of the United States. Even 
Cuba during the revolution was seen as firmly controlled by 
American interests and ties.
It was clear that the United States had no strong
 /
27 W. R. Duncan, 27.
19
20
desire to see Castro*s revolutionary movement, known as "the 
26th of July Movement,” secure power from Fulgencio Batista. 
Through a memorandum issued by United States Ambassador Earl 
Smith shortly before the Cuban elections of 1958, the United 
States made clear its position regarding the revolution. 
Smith wrote: "Our [U.S.] interests and those of Cuba will
best be served by the continuation in office of the present 
[Batista] government, ... by the holding of free, open, and 
honest elections, and by the emergence of an administration 
that would have the support of a majority of the people and 
be able to maintain law and order, and fulfill Cuba's 
international obligations."28 Although Castro denied that 
the communists had any significant influence within his 
movement, the United States continued to denounce Castro's 
revolution as anti-democratic and made regular arms shipment 
to Batista's forces to continue their fight against Castro. 
American support for Batista reflected the United States' 
concern that American interests in Cuba would be less secure 
under Castro.
When Castro took control of the government in January 
1959, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was 
eager to initiate warm ties with his revolutionary 
government. The Soviet Union had no reason to expect that
28 Alan H. Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into 
the Arms of the Soviets?," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., 
Cuban Communism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1989), 30.
21
Castro would declare himself and his government communist.
As Castro and his followers began their fight against 
Batista, they were quick to align themselves with the pro­
democracy capitalists who also sought an end to Batista's 
rule. As that support base began to falter, Castro was 
equally willing to seek the support of the People's 
Socialist Party (PSP), as the Cuban Communist Party was then 
known. However, the PSP was distrustful of Castro's sudden 
goodwill and was reluctant to embrace the regime too 
eagerly. Similarly, the Soviet Union was opposed to 
immediate diplomatic ties with Castro's government since 
such ties could imperil Soviet-American relations.29 In 
fact, the Soviet Union did not grant Castro's Cuba formal 
diplomatic recognition until June 1960, over one year after 
Castro instituted his revolutionary government.30
Poor relations between Cuba and the United States began 
when Castro initiated a war of words with the United States 
almost immediately after he took control of the island. In 
March 1959 Castro agreed to visit the United States at the 
invitation of the American Association of Newspaper 
Publishers. Following an address to the organization in 
Washington, DC, Castro was asked about the future direction 
of Cuban foreign policy. Avoiding a precise statement, he
29 Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin 
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 
103.
30 J. I. Dominguez, 22.
22
stressed that he was not concerned about aggression that 
might come from "other continents,** but about attacks by 
"mercenary bands" that could come from the beaches of 
Florida or from Santo Domingo.31
Castro*s preoccupation with the island's security and 
fears of intervention from the United States were 
legitimately founded. In December 182 3 James Monroe warned 
European powers that the United States "should consider any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion 
of this [Western] Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety."32 The Monroe Doctrine served as the basis for 
U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America until 1947 when all 
American nations, including the United States, signed the 
Rio Treaty which called for "immediate consultation" in the 
event of an aggression against any American state.33 
However, since 1898 when the United States secured Cuba's 
independence from Spain as a result of the Spanish American 
War, the island has occupied a unique position in U.S. 
foreign policy. Under the Platt Amendment, a series of 
clauses incorporated into the Cuban Constitution of 1902, 
the United States retained the legal right to intervene, at 
its discretion, in Cuba's internal affairs. Before the
31 Andres Suarez, Cuba; Castroism and Communism. 1959- 
1966 (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), 47.
32 "Is Castro's Cuba A Soviet Base?," U.S. News and
World Report (September 10, 1962), 44.
33 Ibid.
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amendment was repealed in 1934, the United States deemed it 
necessary to intervene on several occasions. The United 
States occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909, landed troops in 
1917, and took temporary control of the nation's economy in 
1933.34
Castro's fear of intervention by the United States 
induced him to seek discreetly protection and assistance 
from anti-American nations, particularly communist nations. 
As a result, he sought stronger ties with the Soviet Union, 
the only communist nation that could provide both military 
protection for the island and economic assistance to ensure 
the continued social and economic progress of the 
revolution. He realized that any significant alliance 
between Cuba and the Soviet Union must be founded upon 
ideology, as well as reciprocal economic and strategic 
advantages. Castro, however, had no strong ties to the 
communists in Cuba. During most of the revolution, the PSP 
condemned the 26th of July Movement, including the 
movement's first major act, an attack against the Moncada 
Army Barracks in July 1953, which the communists viewed as 
"putschist" and "bourgeois" in nature.35 Although the PSP 
was outlawed in 1953 by Batista, it opposed any violent acts
34 J. I. Dominguez, 8.
35 T. Ashby, 21.
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designed to bring about the collapse of the Batista 
regime.36 The PSP sought to effect democratic reforms 
employing non-violent, legal, and semi-legal tactics.
Although Castro was not a devout communist, his two 
most important lieutenants in the movement, his brother Raul 
, Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, had well-established ties 
to communist groups. Prior to the revolution Raul Castro 
had attended communist youth festivals, rallies, and 
meetings in Cuba and Eastern Europe. During a trip to 
Eastern Europe in 1953 it is believed that he visited the 
Soviet Union and established contacts with Soviet agents 
before returning to Cuba.37 Che Guevara, a leftist 
revolutionary from Argentina, met Raul Castro in Mexico and 
agreed to return to Cuba with the expedition to overthrow 
Batista. Raul Castro was named Minister of the Armed Forces 
and Guevara was named president of the Central Bank and 
Minister of Industries.38 Later, both men would prove 
essential in lending legitimacy to Castro's declaration that 
his revolution was socialist in nature.
36 It is interesting to note that the Communist party 
in Cuba enjoyed its greatest influence under Batista in the 
late 1930s. Batista, hoping to legitimize his dictatorship 
through national elections, encouraged the Communists (then 
the Revolutionary Union Party) to mobilize the masses behind 
his regime. Batista later outlawed the PSP to win favor 
with the Eisenhower administration.
37 Rafael Fermoselle, Cuban Leadership After Castro: 
Biographies of Cuba's Too Generals (Miami: Ediciones 
Universal, 1987), 33.
38 J. I. Dominguez, 19-20.
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Although Castro did not declare his conversion to 
Marxism-Leninism until December 1961, he immediately sought 
two commitments from the Soviets: first, military protection 
from the United States and its allies throughout Latin 
America, and second, direct economic assistance to begin the 
dismantling of Cuba's economic dependence on the United 
States and American businesses on the island. Although the 
Soviet Union was apprehensive about undermining American 
economic and political interests in Cuba, it seized upon 
Cuban initiatives to develop bilateral trade agreements.
The first Cuban-Soviet economic agreement was signed in 
April 1959. Although its terms were hardly advantageous to 
the Cuban economy, Castro recognized the importance of 
formalizing trade with the Soviet Union in the hope that 
Cuban-Soviet trade would lead eventually to Soviet 
diplomatic recognition of Castro's revolutionary government. 
The United States saw no significant threat posed by the 
agreement since the terms were considerably less favorable 
to Castro's Cuba than earlier Soviet agreements had been to 
Batista's Cuba. For example, it called for the Soviet Union 
to purchase 170,000 tons of Cuban sugar (Cuba's chief 
export), considerably less than it had purchased the 
previous year from the Batista government. Moscow would be 
required to purchase an additional 330,000 tons, but only if 
payments could be made in Soviet merchandise rather than 
currency. When Castro refused to accept Soviet merchandise
26
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in place of desperately needed currency, the Soviet Union 
agreed to purchase the additional sugar outright.39
In a further attempt to improve relations with the 
Soviet Union, Castro invited a high level delegation of 
Soviet officials to visit Cuba in February 1960. The Soviet 
delegation, headed by Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan, was met 
with full honors. During the visit Castro took every 
opportunity to praise the political and economic 
accomplishments of the Soviet Union.40 Many high-level 
discussions took place regarding Cuban-Soviet relations. 
These discussions resulted in the signing of the first 
commercial agreement between Castro's government and the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets committed themselves to purchase 
425,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and extended $100 million in 
credit to Cuba for the purchase of industrial equipment.41 
Yet although Castro was pleased with this strengthening of 
Cuban-Soviet economic ties, he sought an expression of 
Soviet support before finalizing plans to dismantle all 
American economic interests in Cuba.
In 1960, Soviet foreign policy did not emphasize 
increased political activities in Latin America, beyond
39 Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution 
(New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 13.
40 Luis E. Aguilar, "From Immutable Proclamations to 
Unintended Consequences: Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban 
Government, 1959-1986," in I. L. Horowitz, ed., 167.
41 J. Levesque, 14.
continuing to pursue stronger relations with Cuba. Except 
for a few pro-Soviet communist parties, the Soviet Union had 
little encouragement for greater involvement in the region. 
The only three armed revolts by pro-Soviet communists were 
defeated and, until the Cuban revolution, Latin America 
seemed securely guarded within the American sphere of 
influence.42 Although Khrushchev did not wish to 
antagonize U.S.-Soviet relations by overtly accepting Cuba 
into the Soviet camp, he recognized the potential benefits 
from establishing stronger ties with Cuba, particularly 
using Cuba as a base for anti-American rhetoric in the 
region, as a camp for fostering communist activities in the 
region, and as a liaison between the Soviet Union and the 
Third World.43
On February 12, 1960, Khrushchev for the first time 
publicly stated his support for the Castro government in a 
speech before the Indian Parliament in New Delhi.
Khrushchev, expressing satisfaction with Latin American 
people's struggle for independence said, "Our sympathies 
have always been and will always be with countries like Cuba 
who defend their national and economic independence through 
arduous struggle.... The Soviet Union has always given and 
will continue to give disinterested aid and support to all
42 The three armed revolts by pro-Soviet 
revolutionaries include: El Salvador in 1932, Brazil in 
1935, and Guatemala in 1944.
43 T. Ashby, xi.
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countries in their struggle for freedom and independence, in 
their struggle against economic backwardness."44
Following this sign of overt Soviet support for Cuba's 
break with American economic oppression, Castro initiated a 
battle with American businesses in Cuba. On June 29 and 30, 
1960, Cuban authorities seized oil refineries owned and 
operated by Texaco, Esso, and the Shell Oil Company 
following their refusal to process crude oil purchased from 
the Soviet Union.45 Castro then authorized the 
expropriation of all property in Cuba owned by United States 
citizens and businesses. The United States responded by 
cutting U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar by 95 percent for the 
remainder of I960.46 The Soviet Union later agreed to 
purchase all sugar earmarked for sale to the United States. 
This incident served to usher in an era of Cuban-American 
hostilities that would contribute to the solidification of 
Cuban-Soviet ties.
President Eisenhower began planning covert and 
diplomatic maneuvers against Castro's government. In late 
1960 Cuban intelligence learned that the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) was training Cuban exiles to 
invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. By 1961 the United States
44 Pravda (February 15, 1960) as quoted in J. 
Levesque, 15.
45 J. Levesque, 15.
46 J. I. Dominguez, 24-25.
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had imposed an economic, commercial, and financial blockade 
against Cuba, and initiated procedures which would exclude 
Cuba from membership in the Organization of American States 
(O.A.S.).47 In February 1961, the Cuban government 
uncovered a C.I.A. plot to assassinate Castro. And on April 
17, U.S.-backed Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs to 
initiate an unsuccessful coup d'etat. With Cuban-American 
relations officially severed and Castro's suspicions of 
American hostility justified, Castro sought to implant Cuba 
firmly inside the Soviet military camp. He realized that 
the open acceptance of Marxism-Leninism would encourage and 
justify full-fledged Soviet military protection for Cuba.
Castro's "conversion" to communism was a careful and 
deliberate plan intended to secure the Soviet Union's 
acceptance of Castro and his revolution. Castro began by 
encouraging stronger ties between the revolutionary 
government and the PSP. This proved easy since the post­
revolutionary communists were eager to form an alliance with 
the Castro government in order to insure survival of the 
party. Raul Castro and Guevara, whose ties to communist 
ideology were long established, became active in the 
leadership of the PSP.4,8 Finally, on April 2, 1961, Castro 
publicly proclaimed the socialist character of the Cuban 
revolution. Following Castro's remarks a key advisor
47 W. R. Duncan, 35.
48 A. Suarez, 151.
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explained that the revolution had completed the stage of 
national liberation and Cuba had definitely embarked upon 
the construction of a socialist state.49 By mid-1961 
Pravda and other Soviet publications had begun referring to 
Cuba as a Marxist-Leninist state.
In July 1961, Castro created the Integrated 
Revolutionary Organization which united into one body the 
26th of July Movement, the PSP, and the Revolutionary 
Directorate, a student group active in the movement against 
the Batista government. Castro then created a new communist 
party, the United Party of the Socialist Revolution and 
defended its creation in a five hour speech to the nation on 
December 1, 1961. It was during this speech that he 
celebrated his “conversion to Marxism-Leninism."50
Castro's plans seemed to work as intended. The Soviet 
leaders resolved that the conceivable benefits gained from a 
constructive alliance with Cuba, particularly a potentially 
stronger and influential presence in Latin America and the 
Third World, outweighed the negative effects the alliance 
would have on Soviet relations with the United States. As 
the Soviet Union began to recognize Castro's commitment to 
communism, arms shipments to the island were increased. The 
Soviet Union bolstered Cuba's physical security by providing
49 J. Levesque, 30.
50 Theodore Draper, "Castro's 'New' Communists," The 
New Leader (April 16, 1962), 3.
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most of the equipment for the island's armed forces, an 
amount estimated at $933 million between 1961 and 1975.51 
Khrushchev clearly wanted to take advantage of the strategic 
importance of Cuba as a bridge to establishing stronger 
political and economic ties with other Latin American 
nations. The Soviet government began to declare its 
confidence in the possibility of other successful communist- 
led national liberation movements in the Western Hemisphere. 
A major Soviet foreign policy paper, published by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961, 
declared:
The triumph of the revolution in Cuba dispelled 
the myth of the omnipotent power of American 
imperialism in Latin America. It showed that the 
United States of America in the present 
international situation cannot undertake armed 
intervention in the countries of Latin America 
with her former ease.... The Cuban 
Revolution...became the model of national 
liberation movements in the Western Hemisphere.52 
Although both sides were comfortable with the 
relationship which had developed between Cuba and the Soviet
51 W. R. Duncan, 38.
52 F. G. Zuev, I.V. Ivashin, and V. P. Nikhamin, eds., 
International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR. 
1917-1960 (Moscow: State Publishing House of the Higher 
Party School of the CPSU Central Committee, 1961), 506-518, 
as quoted in T. Ashby, 30.
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Union, the military aspect of the relationship quickly and 
unexpectedly assumed greater significance. In 1962, 
Khrushchev decided to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuba in 
response to a U.S. statement that disclosed an American 
advantage over the Soviets in tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons.53 Khrushchev’s decision was precipitated by 
attacks by leading members of the CPSU who questioned 
Khrushchev's ability to maintain Soviet parity with the 
United States and called on Khrushchev to prove his 
leadership. In response to the American boast and 
dissension within the party, Khrushchev decided to take 
advantage of his new relationship with Castro. The 
deployment of nuclear missiles on the island would help to 
equalize Soviet deficiencies in the balance of nuclear 
strategic weapons. Khrushchev, however, sought to have 
Castro initiate the missile agreement and sent a special 
envoy to convince Castro of an imminent threat of another 
invasion by the United States.54 Castro was convinced and 
decided that the only way to defend against American 
aggression was to accept deployment of Soviet missiles.
Khrushchev received approval for nuclear arms shipments 
to Cuba in April 1962 and the mission was begun by late 
July. In August, thirty-seven Soviet dry-cargo ships 
arrived at Cuban ports, at least twenty of them carrying
53 T. Ashby, 33.
54 Ibid.
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arms shipments. By the end of the month the Soviets had 
sent surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, guided 
missile boats, and tons of support materials. The first 
medium-range ballistic missiles arrived on September 8, 
hidden in the hold of a Soviet lumber ship. Delivery 
systems, including Soviet bombers and fighter jets, 
followed. By the end of September the island was a 
functional, tightly guarded nuclear installation. The bases 
were under complete Soviet control and even Castro's most 
trusted military officers were denied access to the 
bases.55 In September 1962 Castro seemed assured of the 
Soviets' commitment to Cuba and the protection of the 
island.
Yet the weakness of Soviet dedication to the military 
defense of Cuba was revealed in October 1962 following the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 14, President John Kennedy 
was presented with proof of a Soviet nuclear arms build-up 
on Cuba. A direct confrontation between the United States 
and theSoviet Union began when the United States presented 
its proof before the United Nations and demanded that 
further nuclear arms shipments to Cuba be halted and current 
nuclear arms be removed from the island. On October 22, 
Kennedy imposed a naval blockade of Cuba. The following 
day, in an attempt to create a pacific settlement of the 
crisis, Castro told the United States that the Soviet
55 Ibid., 34-35.
34
military hardware would not be necessary if the United 
States would give Cuba "effective and satisfactory 
guarantees with respect to [Cuba's] territorial integrity 
and ... cease in its subversive and counterrevolutionary 
activities against [the Cuban] people."56 On October 28, 
Khrushchev agreed to dismantle offensive armaments under 
United Nations supervision.
Castro was dissatisfied with the resolution since the 
United States was not made to publicly agree to respect the 
sovereignty of Castro*s communist government and the 
territorial integrity of Cuba. The missile crisis clearly 
proved to Castro that the Soviet Union was more committed to 
avoiding nuclear confrontation with the United States than 
it was to encouraging the growth of communism in Cuba and 
other Latin American nations. This revelation encouraged 
Castro’s eventual break from Soviet-style communism and 
adoption of a Marxist system more suited to his control over 
Cuba.
Despite the crisis' disclosure of the true political 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Castro had 
sound economic reasons for sustaining ties with the Soviet 
Union. In 1961 and 1962 the Soviet Union had provided Cuba 
with subsidized oil and purchased nearly half the sugar the 
island produced at inflated prices. The Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe also provided Cuba with substantial economic
56 J. I. Dominguez, 37.
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aid-57 However, even this relationship was strained when 
the Soviets called-for economic reforms in Chiba. In May 
1962, Khrushchev addressed a group of Cuban students 
returning to their homeland and warned them that Soviet aid 
alone would not be sufficient to cure Cuba's economic 
ills.58 Khrushchev began signalling that the Soviet Union 
was not willing to subsidize Cuba's faltering economy unless 
significant reforms were initiated. The Soviet Union was 
most concerned about Castro's plans to initiate a plan of 
radical industrialization which overestimated Cuba's access 
to raw materials, technology, and other imports. Khrushchev 
feared that Castro's industrial ambitions reflected an 
overly optimistic view of the Soviet Union's ability and 
desire to foster and sustain a strong, albeit inefficient, 
industrial basis for the Cuban economy. Castro, however, 
was not willing to accept Soviet intrusion into Cuba's 
domestic affairs so soon after having defended itself from 
American encroachment. Surprisingly, the two nations signed 
a trade agreement in late 1962 which was quite favorable to 
the Cubans. The Soviets nonetheless showed their 
dissatisfaction with Castro's policies by delaying shipment 
of food to the island.
Despite the loss of Cuba as a strategic nuclear 
military base, the Soviets continued to see the island as
57 N. Miller, 89-90.
58 Ibid., 41.
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their most effective sounding board for pro-communist 
rhetoric to Latin America. However, Castro's move away from 
Soviet political dominance later caused clear discords in 
Soviet and Cuban approaches to communist advancement in 
Latin America. Castro pretentiously insisted on the role of 
armed struggle as a vehicle to change in Latin America and 
called for Soviet military assistance to insurgent groups 
throughout the region. This issue would seal the coffin on 
Cuban-Soviet relations until a temporary compromise on the 
issue could be reached following the fall of Khrushchev as 
leader of the CPSU in Qc^ob1e.r._i964.
During the first six years of years of Soviet-Cuban 
relations, both nations began to establish objectives that 
would continue to determine the state of the relationship. 
However, it was clearly Castro who attracted Soviet interest 
in Cuba and the Soviets who served Cuban interests. Because 
of his clearly defined goals, Castro was able to direct the 
formation of Cuban-Soviet ties. His most important 
objective was national security and protection against the 
reassertion of American domination. This objective was met 
to Castro's satisfaction with the installation of Soviet 
arms on the island, a project that continued until the 
missile crisis of 1962. Castro's second objective was 
economic assistance to improve the standard of living on the 
island and ensure the success of the revolution. The Soviet 
Union helped secure this objective by providing Cuba with
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considerable economic assistance. In return, Khrushchev, 
whose objectives were less clearly developed, expected Cuban 
allegiance to Soviet-style communism and, possibly, greater 
influence in Latin America and the Third World. The Soviet 
Union also hoped to arm Cuba and use the island as its 
Caribbean fortress. But, when this objective directly 
clashed with Khrushchev*s desire to maintain peaceful 
coexistence with the United States, the Soviet relations 
with the United States proved more critical. Although the 
ties developed quickly, the conditions for the alliance 
remained poorly defined and the first major test to the 
alliance, the Cuban Missile Crisis, threatened to overshadow 
the benefits each nation derived from the relationship.
Chapter Two
The Destabilization of Cuban-Soviet Relations: 1964-1968
Although Castro withstood pressures to become the 
passive Soviet ally that Khrushchev may have desired when 
the relationship began in 1961, the relationship never 
endangered Soviet relations with other communist nations. 
However, when Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, he was 
succeeded by a more cautious leadership which sought to move 
more slowly in developing relationships in the Third World, 
especially with Cuba. As he became aware of Moscow's more 
cautious approach to Cuban-Soviet ties,-Castro's criticism 
of Soviet foreign policy became more vocal and more 
frequent.59 Castro and the new Soviet leadership differed 
on several important policy priorities, including the role 
of armed struggle to promote communism in the Third World 
and the level of Soviet support of communist rebels in 
Vietnam.
The issue of armed struggle proved to be one of the 
most divisive issues affecting Cuban-Soviet relations.
Castro first made clear his support for revolutionary 
violence in Latin America following a meeting of the foreign
59 W. R. Duncan, 51-52.
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ministers of O.A.S. member states in January 1962. At the 
meeting the member states, most of whom already had severed 
diplomatic ties with Castro's Cuba, passed resolutions that 
displayed antagonism toward Castro's revolution and the 
growth of communism in Latin America. Among them were 
resolutions stating that "the principles of communism are 
incompatible with the principles of the inter-American 
system,” and that the "present government of Cuba, which has 
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist 
government, is incompatible with the inter-American system" 
and was thereby suspended from participation in it.60 
Other resolutions excluded Cuba from inter-American defense 
trade and alliances, including the Organization of American 
States.
Castro's response came shortly after the conclusion of 
the conference. On February 5, 1962 he proclaimed the 
Second Declaration of Havana, in which he urged the "colored 
races" and peasants of the Americas to rise up in armed 
struggle against their oppressors.61 Castro's principles 
coincided with the beliefs of most Chinese communist leaders 
who were encouraging armed struggle in Asia. This worried
60 J. I. Dominguez, 27.
61 A. Suarez, 145-146.
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the Soviets who were battling with China for leadership of 
communist parties in thei Third.World. Cuba was the Soviet 
Union's most loyal ally in the Third World and the Soviets 
did not enjoy seeing Castro espouse the tenets of the 
Chinese Communist Party.
Castro's first implementation of the idea of armed 
struggle was revealed by the Venezuelan government in the 
fall of 1963 when a shipment of arms to Venezuelan 
guerrillas was discovered. The arms were traced back to 
Cuba and Cuba was charged by Venezuela and other O.A.S. 
member states with an aggression against Venezuela and an 
intervention into its internal affairs. Castro claimed his 
actions were fair retaliation against Venezuela for having 
led the move to exclude Cuba from all inter-American 
activities. Castro argued that "the people of Cuba consider 
themselves to have an equal right to help, with the 
resources that are available to them, the revolutionary 
movements in all countries that engage in such intervention 
in the internal affairs of our country."62 All Latin 
American governments, except Mexico, had agreed to the 
resolutions which served to isolate Cuba, and thus all were 
potential targets of Castro's reprisal.
By the end of 1964, the new Soviet leadership attempted 
to come to an agreement with Castro on the issue of armed
62 Obra revolucionaria. no. 18 (1964), as quoted in J. 
I. Dominguez, 29.
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struggle. To emphasize its dedication to Third World 
communist parties, the Soviet Union organized a conference 
of Latin American communist parties which was held in 
December in Havana. It was clear that the communist parties 
of Latin America were themselves divided over which route 
would be the most effective to bring about political change. 
Some agreed that revolution was the most effective means to 
wrest power from the bourgeoisie while others maintained 
that ^communist parties must make all attempts to bring about 
change without resorting to armed struggle.
Recognizing the divisions among the regional communist 
parties, the Soviets and Cubans came to an agreement. The 
Soviets agreed to support armed struggle in six Latin 
American nations where communist-led revolutionary activity 
was already occurring, namely Venezuela, Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti. However, the 
Cubans conceded to recognize unarmed struggle as the 
legitimate course for pro-Soviet communist parties to follow 
in other Latin American nations.63 As a result of the 
conference, the Soviets believed that they had quelled a 
major rift that threatened to separate Cuba and other Latin 
American communist parties from the Soviet camp, but the 
rift had only temporarily been bridged.
By 1965 the weakness of Latin American communist 
parties' commitment to armed struggle was exposed. Even the
63 W. R. Duncan, 63.
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communist party in Venezuela, the most committed to armed 
struggle, began to reassess the effectiveness of its 
guerrilla faction and decided to seek legal or semi-legal 
means to attain a communist presence in the government. 
Similar developments elsewhere led Castro and other Cuban 
communist leaders to abandon the 1964 agreement and denounce
non-violent communist parties for their ineffectiveness,
/ ■
bureaucracy, and lack of commitment to the communist 
cause.64
Castro decided to support armed struggle in the Third 
World wholeheartedly, despite any negative effects on Cuban- 
Soviet relations. In January 1966 Castro organized the 
Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin 
American communist parties. At the conference, Castro was 
candid regarding his policy disputes with the Soviets. He 
again raised the issue of armed struggle, hoping to find 
sympathetic supporters among the Chinese and other Asian 
representatives, particularly the North Koreans and the 
North Vietnamese. The Soviet representatives looked on with 
astonishment as Castro closed the conference with a blatant 
condemnation of the Soviets' position on armed struggle: 
...sooner or later all or almost all peoples will 
have to take up arms to liberate themselves....
What with the ones who theorize and the ones who 
criticize those who theorize while beginning to
64 E. Mujal-Leon, 128.
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theorize themselves, much energy and time is 
unfortunately lost? we believe that on this 
continent, in the case of all or almost all 
peoples, the battle will take on the most violent 
forms.65
These words signalled to the Soviet representatives and the 
representatives of other communist nations that Cuba was 
intent upon causing a major breach in Cuban-Soviet 
relations.
One example of the issues that led to open clashes 
between the Soviet Union and Cuba involved the degree of 
Soviet support for communist Viet Cong guerrillas.
Beginning in 1965 Castro stepped up his indictments against 
Moscow's handling of the conflict in Vietnam.66 Throughout 
1965 the United States had steadily increased its bomb 
attacks against communist guerrillas in North Vietnam.
Castro felt that the Soviets were neglecting their 
"socialist brethren" and called for increased aid to the 
guerrillas to promote retaliation against American forces.
A Cuban delegate addressing the Twenty-Third Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1966 stated 
that, in combatting U.S. backed imperialism, it is necessary 
to "use all available means...and take all necessary risks."
65 Ibid., 70.
66 Ibid., 65-66.
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The delegate's remarks received no applause.67
The Cuban government's message was clear and the ball 
was plainly in the Soviets' court. Communist parties 
throughout the world, including those in other Latin 
American nations, began to call for official sanctions 
against Castro's Cuba. However, the Soviets, fearful of 
isolating Cuba and leaving it susceptible to 
counterrevolution, resisted.58 To cut off military and 
economic assistance to Cuba would entail leaving Cuba 
vulnerable to intervention by the United States or 
diplomatic action by the O.A.S. that would lead to the 
overthrow of Castro. And since there was no other strong 
communist representative in Latin America, this would leave 
the Soviets without an ally in the region. For this reason, 
the Soviets did not want to alienate Castro. The Soviets 
realized that Cuba was unlikely to break with them so long 
as it needed Soviet military and economic assistance. And 
although the Soviets were investing considerable resources 
in their relationship with Cuba, the island remained a 
beneficial and necessary ally.
Although Moscow did not want to cut off Cuba from 
Soviet financial assistance, it did seek some form of 
retaliation against Cuba's criticism. When Arab nations 
called for an oil embargo in 1967, the Soviets took
67 W. R. Duncan, 65-66.
58 J. Levesque, 132-133.
advantage of the potential impact its oil exportation 
policies could have on foreign relations. The Soviets^ 
ignored Cuban requests for a ten percent increase in Soviet 
oil imports, respondingwith only a two percent increase in 
1 9 6 7 ^ -The Soviet Union sold the remaining oil on the 
open market to earn much-needed hard currency to finance its 
own internal economic expansion. There is little doubt that 
both sides recognized that such economic sanctions were one 
of the most powerful weapons available to the Soviets for 
applying pressure on the unrepentant Cuban regime. Castro 
was aware of the economic importance of Soviet oil shipments 
to Cuban industry. The Soviets also suspended military 
shipments to Cuba in 1968, cut Cuban enrollment in Soviet 
universities, limited technical assistance to Cuba, and 
delayed trade agreements with Cuba in 1968.70
The worsening of Cuban-Soviet relations in this period 
was due primarily to Castro1s desire to prove himself as the 
predominant communist leader in Latin America and the 
uncontested representative of Third World interests to the 
Soviet Union. He worked vigorously to preserve Cuba's 
elevated, and arguably undeserving, status in the eyes of 
the Soviet Union. Similarly, he did not want to give the 
impression of becoming a puppet whose actions were directed 
by the Soviet Union. He took every opportunity to disclose
69 N. Miller, 108-109.
70 J. I. Dominguez, 75.
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where his and the Soviet leadership's views differed. His 
willingness to openly and forcefully confront Soviet leaders 
on an issue as delicate as armed struggle signalled to the 
Soviets his perception that Cuba's position within the 
relationship was secure. Soviet leaders agreed that 
Castro's position was secure and wanted to ensure his 
continued alliance to the Soviet Union.
Castro recognized the importance of Soviet military and 
economic assistance to his island's security and prosperity, 
but his dedication to Cuban communism and Cuba's agenda in 
Latin America and the Third World encouraged him to resist 
political submission to the Soviet Union. The Soviets were 
aware of the friction Cuba was causing within and outside 
the Soviet camp of communist parties, but did not want to 
risk pushing Castro toward developing relations with China 
or the United States. Both sides realized that, if the 
relationship was to continue, common ground must be 
discovered and the policy aims of both nations must be taken 
into account. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and Castro's acclaim for the action provided that common 
ground, which would lead to renewed accommodation in Cuban- 
Soviet relations.
Chapter Three
Renewed Accommodation in Cuban-Soviet Relations: 1968-1975
By the end of 1967, Castro was facing the greatest 
challenges to his government since the end of the 
revolution. Ernesto "Che” Guevara, one of his greatest 
advisors and a major hero of the 26th of July Movement, had 
been killed in Bolivia on October 8 after having been 
ostracized by the Bolivian communist revolutionaries he was 
trying to lead. The death of Guevara symbolized the 
deteriorating support for armed struggle among Latin 
American revolutionaries. Many of the communist parties 
that had earlier supported Castro's call for violent methods 
began to accept the Soviet line of non-violent revolution. 
The growing allegiance to Soviet-style communism reflected 
Castro's failing influence in the region.71
Castro's loss of credibility among Third World 
revolutionaries stemmed, in part, from Cuba's worsening 
economy. Despite continued Soviet assistance, though at 
lower levels than Castro had demanded, the economy began to 
collapse. Cuba's economy began to reflect badly on the
71 Christopher Whalen, "The Soviet Military Buildup in 
Cuba," in I. L. Horowitz, 625-626.
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government as trade deficits with the Soviet Union 
increased, goods grew scarce, and rationing became part of 
the status quo.72 To other pro-communist regimes in the 
Third World, the Cuban model of revolution and development 
was no longer attractive.
Brezhnev too was facing mounting problems of his own. 
The threat posed by Cuban criticism of Soviet policies was 
worsened by dissension within the Warsaw Pact and continued 
difficulties with China. The gravest threat to Soviet 
leadership of the socialist world came from Czechoslovakia. 
In 1968, conservative Stalinists were driven from power and 
replaced by reform-minded communists headed by Alexander 
Dubcek who called for greater independence from Soviet 
control. Brezhnev decided to reaffirm Soviet control over 
its satellites, particularly Czechoslovakia. In May 1968 
the Soviet military began conducting maneuvers on Czech 
soil. On August 21, Soviet tanks invaded Prague and forced 
the ouster of Dubcek's government. Castro, recognizing the 
benefits of improved Cuban-Soviet-relations, took notice of 
the severity of Soviet actions and began to reassess his 
firm stand against Soviet influence in Cuban affairs.73 
Although Castro did not fully support the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, he realized that Cuba's economic and
72 T. Ashby, 48.
73 Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987), 22-23.
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security concerns outweighed his aversion to the invasion.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is generally 
recognized as one of the most significant junctures in 
Cuban-Soviet relations. It marked the transition from a 
period of extreme disharmony to one of renewed 
accommodation. However, the transition was not an easy one 
considering Castro's ideology and his commitment to Cuban 
nationalism. The act was clearly a violation of 
Czechoslovakian sovereignty. Castro knew the proposed 
reforms by Dubcek represented a move away from Soviet 
domination and expressed growing Czech nationalism. The day 
after the invasion there was a large demonstration in Havana 
protesting the invasion. However, Castro realized that his 
condemnation of the action could serve only to add to the 
strains on Cuban-Soviet relations.
On August 23, following two days of silence regarding 
the Soviet invasion, Castro defended Soviet actions and 
publicly embraced the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a resolution 
affirming that the Soviet Union retained the right to invade 
any Eastern European nation that threatened to leave the 
socialist camp. Knowing that his position could prove 
unpopular, Castro began his speech to the Cuban people 
saying, "some of the things we are going to say here will be 
in contradiction with the emotions of many." He defended 
his position by arguing that the Czech leadership had been 
"in camaraderie with pro-Yankee spies" and with the agents
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of West Germany and all that fascist and reactionary 
rabble.'*74 The Soviets were pleased with Castro's support 
for Soviet policy and initiated a period of political, 
economic, and military rapprochement with Cuba.
Following more than a decade of neglect of most of its 
critical industries, Castro assented to direct Soviet 
involvement in Cuba's economy. Throughout the 1960s, Castro 
had devoted most of the nation's resources to ensuring the 
social success of his revolution. He poured money into 
public services, including health care and education, so 
that the population could experience the tangible benefits 
of revolution. Although Soviet aid and technology made it 
possible to sustain certain key industries, especially the 
production of sugar and nickel, most of the nation's 
industries and production facilities were run-down and in 
desperate need of modernization.
The Soviets frequently offered to take a more active * 
role in the Cuban economy and urged Castro to adopt a system 
of central economic planning similar to the Soviet model. * 
However, Castro opposed central planning since he thought it 
was too rigid for the rapidly changing Cuban economy. But 
as the economy deteriorated and Castro realized his economic 
strategy was jeopardizing the success of the revolution, he 
began to consider greater compliance with the Soviet model 
and integration into the Soviet bloc. In July 1969, a
74 T. Ashby, 51.
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defector from Cuba's intelligence network revealed that 
Castro had signed an accord with Moscow committing himself 
to a pro-Moscow course, in return for which Moscow agreed to 
continue economic assistance to Cuba and supply 5,000 
technicians to restructure the island's faltering 
economy.75
The Soviet technicians reorganized the Cuban government 
and bureaucracies to parallel the systems found in the 
Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. The 
technicians sought first to legitimize the role of the Cuban 
Communist Party (PCC) as an active body within the Cuban 
government. The political system was reorganized along 
Leninist lines with Castro as head of government and the PCC 
as the primary governing body, albeit a tool to enhance 
Castro's control over the island. The next key step was the 
creation of the Inter-Governmental Cuban-Soviet Commission 
for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, a 
venture begun in 1970 which legitimized and facilitated 
Soviet-sponsored economic and political reforms in Cuba.76 
In 1975 the Cuban government announced the nation's first 
five-year economic plan for 1976 through 1980.77 The plan 
was designed and implemented by Soviet and Eastern European
75 W. R. Duncan, 76.
76 Ibid., 85.
77 Sergio G. Roca, "State Enterprise in Cuba under the 
New System of Planning and Management," in I. L. Horowitz, 
299-300.
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technicians. The most important move came in July 1972 when 
Cuba was admitted to the Soviet-directed Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). This gave the Soviet Union and 
±€s communist allies greater control over the reorganization 
of the Cuban economy in a manner more closely resembling the 
Soviet model.78
The period following Cuban admission into the CMEA was 
marked by the paradox of integration between Cuba and its 
communist allies in organizational matters and divergence 
between them in balance of trade. Cuba benefitted greatly 
from access to CMEA markets, especially the ability to 
import larger amounts of raw materials and manufactured 
goods from East Germany and the Soviet Union. Eastern 
European nations failed to benefit significantly from the 
limited agricultural goods, primarily sugar and tobacco, 
exported from Cuba. Although the Soviets did not want to 
increase Cuban dependence on Soviet bloc trade, they sought 
to maintain adequate dependence to ensure Cuba's continued 
need of the Soviet bloc.79 The Soviets, appreciating their 
increased influence over Cuban political and economic 
matters, were careful not to make specific demands on 
Castro. Castro, who had come to power on his own and proven 
himself a major figure in the international arena as a 
result of his charisma, strong will, and political
78 P. Shearman, 27.
79 J. I. Dominguez, 84.
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v shrewdness, was more valuable as a willing ally of the 
Soviets than as a controlled puppet. In Cuba he was a 
popular leader whose control was not to be challenged. 
Therefore, Soviet leaders were careful to include Castro in 
decisions regarding Cuba's economy. The Soviets also made 
every attempt to meet Castro'srequests whenever they"were 
not detrimental to Soviet aims and interests.80 For 
example, Cuba was awarded economic favors at Castro's 
request, including rescheduling of Cuba's trade debt with 
the Soviet Union, heavily subsidized agriculture, and 
modernization of industry.
For the Soviets, stronger economic ties with Cuba 
helped to ensure Soviet influence in economic, political, 
and foreign affairs. By the mid-1970s, the Cuban economy 
was so dependent on Soviet economic assistance that Castro 
could not afford to turn away from the Soviet Union without 
jeopardizing the island's economy. Cuban membership in the 
CMEA, through which most of the economic benefits were 
acquired, demanded Castro's full political and economic 
cooperation. Cuba's membership also displayed the expanding 
influence that the Soviet Union was enjoying throughout the 
world. By generously subsidizing the Cuban economy, the 
Soviets hoped to use the island as an example of the Soviet 
commitment to Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third
80 W. R. Duncan, 86.
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World.81
Besides serving Moscow as an international proxy, Cuba 
remained important to the Soviet Union for strategic 
reasons. Following Cuban-Soviet rapprochement, the Soviets 
sought to refortify Cuba as a military bastion. In 1968 the 
Soviet navy extended its forward deployment to include the 
Arabian Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Caribbean.82 To service the Soviet fleet in the Caribbean, 
the Soviets acquired Cuban permission to construct a base at 
Cienfuegos, Cuba. In July 1969, as the Soviet Union was 
preparing for the opening round of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT I), a nine-ship Soviet navy task 
force, including one nuclear submarine, visited Cuba and 
conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Mexico.83 This task 
force marked the first time since the destruction of the 
Spanish fleet off Santiago de Cuba in 1898 that the naval 
force of a rival extrahemispheric power had been allowed to 
enter the Caribbean without United States intervention. The 
United States chose to ignore the maneuvers. Nixon, 
perceiving no threat from the task force, did not want to 
respond in any way that might have jeopardized negotiations 
for a possible U.S.-Soviet SALT agreement.84
81 P. Shearman, 30-31.
82 T. Ashby, 65.
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In late 1969, the Soviet Union and Cuba arranged 
several high-level meetings to discuss improved military 
relations. In November, Soviet Defense Minister Andrei 
Grechko visited Cuba before attending the SALT I meetings 
with the United States. In April 1970, Cuban Armed Forces 
Minister Raul Castro spent five weeks in the Soviet Union 
and met personally with Brezhnev.85 In June 1970, the U.S. 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, alerted 
President Nixon to increased Soviet military activity in 
Cuba. He warned:
While the Soviet naval visits may be part of the 
overall trend in recent years toward increased 
Soviet naval activity ever further from Soviet 
home ports, they may also be an effort to 
'•accustom" Washington to greater Soviet use of 
Cuba by establishing gradually the precedent of 
visits and bunkering of active Soviet fleet and 
air units. The Soviets could conceivably wish to 
maintain Soviet naval units in the Caribbean-South 
Atlantic on a more or less permanent basis, 
refueling and resupplying out of Cuba.86 
United States intelligence personnel began to pay 
considerable attention to the activities of the Soviet
85 J. I. Dominguez, 79.
86 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: 
Little Brown and Co., 1979), 637, as quoted in T. Ashby, 68.
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military in and around Cuba.
In September 1970, the United States collected evidence 
of what appeared to be the construction of a permanent base 
for Soviet nuclear submarines at Cienfuegos. Since the 
construction of the installation could afford the Soviets a 
base for nuclear hardware and delivery systems, the incident 
was compared to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the issue 
served as a test of the secret agreement which resulted from 
the crisis prohibiting Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba in 
exchange for U.S. recognition of Cuban sovereignty.87 When 
American congressional leaders called for action, the United 
States and the Soviet Union arranged for quiet negotiations. 
These negotiations yielded an agreement by which Moscow 
agreed to stop servicing nuclear submarines in Cuban 
ports.88
Although it appeared the Soviets once again had given 
in to U.S. pressure, the Soviets decided to test the 
agreement. Brezhnev ordered Soviet nuclear submarines to 
continue using the base at Cienfuegos for servicing and 
naval exercises continued for over a year without any 
response from the United States. It is generally believed 
that the United States was aware of the submarines and their 
visits to Cienfuegos, but the Nixon administration ignored 
the violations in order to ensure good relations between the
87 P. Shearman, 26.
88 C. Whalen, in I. L. Horowitz, 627.
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United States and Soviet Union at the SALT I meetings in May 
1971.89 Castro was pleased with the Soviet*s noncompliance 
with the agreement. By testing the U.S. response, the 
Soviet Union had shown that Cuba was a vital part of Soviet 
strategy.90 This assured Castro that the Soviets were 
willing to arm and defend the island.
Soviet military activity in Cuba continued to increase 
steadily throughout the 1970s and Castro remained an ardent 
supporter of Soviet foreign policy. There were many signs 
of the strong relations between the two nations, including a 
trip by Brezhnev to Cuba in January 1975, shortly after the 
fifteenth anniversary^of the Cuban Revolution. Although 
Khrushchev had been invited to visit Cuba several times, he 
feared that such a visit would have an adverse effect on 
U.S.-Soviet relations. And by the time Brezhnev had 
consolidated power in the late 1960s, Cuba had stopped 
issuing invitations to Soviet leaders. Therefore, the trip 
symbolized a significant improvement in Cuban-Soviet 
relations. During the trip, Castro publicly assailed the 
United States and China for their recent attempts to 
reconcile and form an anti-Soviet alliance.91 This was 
seen by most observers as an open announcement of renewed 
Cuban-Soviet friendship and a rejection of Chinese goodwill
89 Ibid., 627-628.
90 P. Shearman, 27.
91 J. Levesque, 180-181.
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toward Cuba and other Third World nations.
In June 1975, an international conference of 24 Latin 
American communist parties was held in Havana. Castro used 
the conference as an opportunity to proclaim publicly the 
Cuban-Soviet rapprochement. The conference served to 
demonstrate the firm support the Latin American communist 
parties afforded the Soviet Union and its policies toward 
the United States, China, and the Third World.92 Castro 
again expressed his contentment with improved relations with 
the Soviet Union at the first congress of the Cuban 
Communist Party in December 1975. The congress itself was 
important since it clearly displayed the newly prominent 
position which the PCC occupied in the restructured Soviet- 
style Cuban political system.93
Despite the lavish praise Castro directed toward 
Moscow, the relationship was a two way street. In return, 
Castro received considerable support from the Soviet Union 
when he sought to formalize ties with several African 
nations and act as the spokesman for Soviet and communist 
interests in Africa.94 A tour was organized for March and 
April 1977 which afforded Castro the opportunity to promote 
Cuba's foreign policy agenda and offer Cuban support for 
revolutionary activity throughout the continent and took
92 Ibid., 183.
93 Ibid., 184-185.
94 W. R. Duncan, 136-137.
Castro to eight African nations before ending with an 
official visit to Moscow. The Soviets benefitted 
tremendously as a result of this show of confidence in 
Castro, since he reciprocated by allowing Cuban troops to 
fight a proxy war in Africa on behalf of the Soviet Union.
This period in Cuban-Soviet relations represents a time
 . ... t ' • \  V .
of cordiality and mutual benefit. Although Castro was 
forced to temper his enthusiasm for armed aggression and 
stress compatible aspects of Soviet foreign policy, his 
regime was awarded greater importance and legitimacy in the 
international communist community. Cuba's membership in the 
CMEA, often viewed as a decision that severely restricted 
Cuban autonomy, actually contributed to the security of the 
regime and the benefits of the revolution so long as the 
CMEA trade agreements remained favorable to Cuba.
Similarly, it further accredited Cuba as a representative of
i
communist interests in the Third World. It was during this
i
period that Cuba proved itself an influential actor in 
international politics and paved the route for Cuban-Soviet 
cooperation in Africa and Latin America.
Chapter Four
Cuban-Soviet Foreign Policy Cooperation: 1975-1985
Cuba's foreign policy interests had always centered on 
the promotion of its own security and prosperity. However, 
Castro also sought to establish for himself and his 
government a position in the international community which 
would allow Cuba to champion the causes of developing 
nations generally, and Latin America specifically. Castro 
recognized that there existed a power vacuum in Latin 
America which no nation, other than the United States, was 
able to fill. He aimed to assume the leadership of Latin 
America and break U.S. control over the region and 
recognized the Soviet Union's eagerness to see Castro, its 
only socialist ally in the region, succeed.
Castro's objectives in Latin America and the Third 
World were to redefine the relationship that existed between 
developed and developing nations and secure for developing 
nations access to the resources and technology of more 
advanced nations. Cuba and its beneficial relationship with 
the Soviet Union served as proof that access to such 
resources could promote the development of Third World 
economies and societies. Realizing that he must reach
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beyond Latin America to regions outside of U.S. domination, 
Castro began to focus his attention on the less developed 
nations of Asia and Africa. Despite its close relationship 
with the Soviet Union, Cuba became an active and influential 
member of the Nonaligned Movement, a political association 
of developing nations designed to focus international 
attention on issues relevant to the Third World. Although 
Cuba saw membership in the Movement as a means to acquire 
political leverage independent of the Soviet Union, the 
Movement benefitted from Cuba's well-established clout, both 
politically and economically, in the world community.95 
The Soviets also welcomed Cuba's participation in the 
Movement since Cuba's elevated status within, and eventual 
leadership of, the Movement served to quietly promote 
socialism among developing nations. Both nations aspired to 
increase their influence in the Third World.
By the mid-1970s the strong ties and similar objectives 
between Cuba and the Soviet Union began to manifest 
themselves in the form of foreign policy cooperation in the 
Third World. The early Cuban-Soviet relationship focused on 
Cuba's effectiveness as a model for other pro-communist 
movements in Latin America. Cuba's ability to serve as a 
viable model for African nations was not recognized until 
the beginning of an African reaction against the 
neocolonialism which characterized the post-independence
95 J. I. Dominguez, 219.
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period. Although most European powers had withdrawn from 
Africa, the borders, governments, and economic 
infrastructure that remained revealed a continuing European 
presence. Recognizing that pan-African trade and alliances 
were not remedying the region*s severe economic and social 
problems, many African governments sought the assistance of 
the United States and the Soviet Union.96 Africa, a region 
that once placed very low in the foreign policy priorities 
of the superpowers, was transformed into a major arena of 
Cold War competition as a result of the growing influence of 
developing nations generally.
Brezhnev*s foreign policy goals, independent of 
Castro*s aims, were to advance Moscow's strategic and 
political power in ways which would exhibit the Soviet 
Union's expanding role as a leading global actor, while at 
the same' time undermining Western influence in the 
region.97 Although Marxist-Leninist ideology legitimized 
Soviet expansion in Africa, ideological considerations were 
of secondary importance to the Soviets who sought instead to 
establish good relations with nations which could 
logistically facilitate the Soviet Union's growing air and 
naval capabilities. The Soviets were prepared to extend
96 David E. Albright, ed., Communism in Africa 
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economic and military assistance to well-situated African 
states, particularly those in North Africa and along the 
coasts, that could be of strategic and political use to 
broader Soviet foreign policy aims, particularly the 
stemming of Western and Chinese influence among Third World 
states and providing a greater Soviet voice in African 
affairs.
The emergence of Marxist regimes in Africa in the mid- 
1970s, especially among Portuguese colonies, reflected the 
growing popular dissatisfaction with oppressive colonial and 
post-colonial governments. The Soviets attempted to portray 
these movements as the natural advent of internal class 
struggle which would lead to the global acceptance of 
socialism. One leading Soviet official explained, "the 
socialist orientation in Africa is a continuation of the 
Cause of the October Revolution under the specific 
conditions of its carrying out the high mission of preparing 
the way for the victory of scientific socialism."98 Yet 
although the Soviets warmly welcomed the growth of Afro- 
Marxism, this ideology was a purely African adaptation of 
socialism and should not be viewed as a result of Soviet 
influence on the continent.99 Despite Soviet military and
98 Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Afro- 
Marxist Regimes; Ideology and Public Policy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), 225.
99 B. D. G., in his article "Afro-Marxism: A 
Preliminary View" (African Review, vol. 6, no. 4, 1976), 
distinguishes between African Marxists and Afro-Marxists.
64
economic assistance to African states throughout the 1960s 
and early 1970s, Soviet activities in Africa bore few 
concrete results until 1976 when the Soviet-backed Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeated the 
U.S.-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) following a two year civil war.
Although the Angolan Civil War (1975-1976) represented 
the first significant act of Cuban-Soviet cooperation 
outside of Latin America, this cooperative effort was not 
strictly a result of Soviet initiatives in Africa. It is 
argued that the Cuban government, hoping to extend its own 
influence beyond Latin America, set the stage for active 
Soviet involvement in the war in Angola. Cuban support for
Angolan communists and the MPLA began in the 1960s when
/
Castro arranged for the training of MPLA-backed soldiers in 
Cuba. There the soldiers* studies focused on guerrilla 
tactics to be used against the Portuguese colonial 
government.100 Cuban assistance to the MPLA continued and 
expanded to include the deployment of Cuban troops to help 
fight the civil war. By September 1975 more than 20,000 
Cubans had been sent to Angola to fight against the FNLA as
African Marxists attempt to apply strict Soviet-style 
socialism to the prevailing conditions in Africa. Afro- 
Marxists attempt to mold the principles of Soviet socialism 
into a new ideology which adapts to the special conditions 
in Africa.
100 Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 85.
65
soldiers and technical advisors.
Soviet support for the MPLA was less consistent as a 
result of Soviet caution in supporting untested national 
liberation movements as well as previous Soviet failures in 
Africa, particularly the replacement of Soviet-backed 
regimes in Ghana and Mali with pro-U.S. governments in the 
late 1960s.101 Although the Soviet Union began sending 
economic assistance to the MPLA before the Cubans had 
recognized the movement, the flow of aid was uneven. The 
first disruption of aid occurred in 1963 when the Soviets 
temporarily canceled financial assistance to the movement. 
Full aid was restored in 1964. Again in 1972 the Soviet 
Union curtailed military aid, partly as a result of 
political infighting among the MPLA leadership and partly as 
a result of Brezhnev's signing of the Basic Principles 
Agreement which "codified" superpower conduct in global 
politics. Although the MPLA survived and Soviet military 
aid was revived briefly, the Soviets chose to abandon the 
movement in 1974 and focus on improving relations with 
leaders in North Africa, including Muhammar al-Qaddafi of 
Libya and Anwar Sadat of Egypt.102 Once the colonial 
government collapsed and civil war began, the Soviets 
resumed both military and financial aid to the movement to
101 P. Shearman, 35.
102 W. R. Duncan, 122-123.
66
supplement Cuban assistance.103
The Soviet Union and Cuba committed themselves to the 
MPLA at a time when the international system seemed to have 
changed.104 The threat of intervention by the United 
States was minimal since the U.S. had just been defeated in 
Vietnam and American public opinion was strongly opposed to 
new military engagements in the Third World. For the 
Soviets, the time seemed right to extend assistance to a 
fledgling communist movement in Africa in the hopes of 
establishing a loyal regional ally. The Cubans, who also 
sought to project their influence abroad, recognized the war 
as an opportunity to prove themselves useful to Soviet 
operations in the Third World. With the inception of the 
Angolan Civil War,- the Soviet Union began to depend heavily 
on. Cuba as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. The signing of 
the Basic Principles Agreement in June 1974 meant that the 
American president and the Soviet premier would consult one 
another in the event of an international crisis and that 
neither nation would seek unilateral advantage in the event 
of a regional crisis in the Third World.105 Therefore, in 
order to influence the Angolan crisis without consulting or 
involving the United States, Brezhnev decided to take 
advantage of the cooperative relationship between Cuba and
103 Ibid., 128-129.
104 J. I. Dominguez, 152.
105 P. Shearman, 35-36.
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the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev entrusted Castro with considerable 
responsibility concerning the conduct of the civil war. 
However, this was not merely a gesture of good faith on 
Brezhnev's part but reflected the Soviet Union's need to 
focus its troops and attention on other conflicts. Since 
the Cubans had available troops to send to Angola, the 
Soviet was able to focus its attention, resources, and 
troops on the growing conflict in Afghanistan. Although the 
Soviets provided significant military counsel, Castro was in 
command of the communist forces. For example, it was 
Castro's decision to dramatically increase Cuban troop 
deployments to Angola following the arrival of five thousand 
South African troops to assist the FNLA in October 1975. 
Several hundred Cuban advisors helped to plan strategy for 
the MPLA and the largest clash of the civil war involved 
Cuban troops representing the MPLA and South African troops 
representing the FNLA and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA). Approximately two hundred 
Cuban troops died during the three day battle.106
Castro's role as the Soviet representative in Angola 
continued following the victory of the MPLA forces. Cuba 
maintained a force of 25,000 troops in Angola to help 
protect against South African intervention. In 1984 Angola 
and South Africa agreed to negotiate the withdrawal of
106 OP. S. Falk, 88.
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foreign troops. Castro's new status as the Soviet spokesman 
in the Third World was obvious as he met with Angolan 
officials to outline the terms for foreign troop 
withdrawal.107
By the late 1970s Cuba had established its presence 
throughout Africa and the Middle East. Cuban forces abroad 
in the late 1970s accounted for two-thirds of the military 
and technical personnel stationed by all communist states in 
the Third World —  exceeding Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
and Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia. In addition to 
troops, Cuba dispatched advisors, technicians, and 
construction workers to Algeria, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Grenada in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.108 By 1979 Cuba was helping to 
defend Soviet interests not only in Angola, but also in 
Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.
In each of these cases, Cuban and Soviet foreign policy 
goals converged as they had in Angola. The Angolan civil 
war proved that Cuba was a reliable ally. Cuban assistance 
to Ethiopian resistance against Somolia (1977-1978) proved 
that Cuba's aims could be restricted to a single task and
107 W. R. Duncan, 131-132.
108 Robert A. Packenham, "Cuba and the USSR: What Kind 
of Dependency?," in I. L. Horowitz, 161.
(Cuban troop and advisor totals in 1978: 35,000 in 
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400 in South Yemen, 100-150 in Guinea Bassau, 50 in 
Tanzania, 20 in Iraq, and 15-60 in Zambia.)
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would not necessarily involve the occupation of a nation 
after the task had been successfully accomplished. Although 
the Cubans acted with considerable autonomy in Angola, in 
Ethiopia the Cuban forces were used to augment Soviet forces 
backing Ethiopian resistance in a border dispute with 
Somalia. Soviet and Cuban troops acted in unison, though 
generally with Soviet leadership and following Soviet 
guidelines.109 This was due in part to the fact that the 
Soviet Union had a vested interest in Ethiopia because of 
its use of the nation as a strategic base. The Cuban 
commitment was considerable, and by early 1978 its presence 
had grown to about 12,000 troops.110 As a reward for Cuban 
assistance in Ethiopia, the Soviets provided Cuba with 
increased economic and military aid and more frequent 
shipments of oil, nickel, and other natural resources.
The late 1970s also represented a time of Cuban-Soviet 
cooperation in Central America. Given its geographical 
proximity to Nicaragua and El Salvador, Cuba naturally had 
greater interest in assisting fledgling communist movements 
in those nations. Cuba had supported national liberation 
movements there since the early 1960s, even in the face of 
Soviet indignation and banishment from regional alliances 
and trade. However, by the late 1970s, the Soviets 
acknowledged Cuba*s ability to effectively represent Soviet
109 W. R. Duncan, 127.
110 P. Shearman, 52.
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interests in the region. Although the Soviets still sought 
caution when supporting revolutions in the United States' 
back yard, Castro desperately wanted to see greater 
revolutionary activity throughout Latin America. When the 
revolutions began in Nicaragua (1977-1979) and El Salvador 
(1979-1981), the United States tried to prevent the spread 
of socialism in Latin America by funding and supplying anti­
communist forces there. The Soviet Union, which saw the 
emergence of any communist government in the region as an 
important step toward breaking U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America, was eager to provide economic and military support 
the FSLN because of its professed dedication to Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine and its dedication to Soviet-style 
communism.111 As a result, the Soviets provided weapons 
and limited logistical support through Cuba, which also 
wanted to see the spread of communism in Latin America since 
it would translate to potential anti-American allies in the 
region.112
Cuba provided the guerrilla forces in both countries, 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN or 
Sandinistas) in Nicaragua and the Popular Forces of 
Liberation (FPL) in El Salvador, in an attempt to overthrow 
the ruling governments and install socialist regimes. In 
Nicaragua the Cubans helped train, arm, and transfer an
111 T. Ashby, 106-107.
112 W. R. Duncan, 155-156.
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"internationalist brigade" to fight alongside the FSLN which 
was seeking to overthrow the oligarchical regime of General 
Anastasio Somoza. By late 1979 Cuba had sent nearly 3,000 
civilians (teachers, doctors, and health care professionals) 
to assist the FSLN. In addition, Cuba provided the 
Sandinista movement with over 15,000 military and security 
advisors.113 Despite the rebels' victory in Nicaragua, the 
Cuban and Soviet assistance should not be overemphasized.
The rebels received considerable assistance from many 
nations, including democracies in Latin America (Venezuela, 
Mexico, and Costa Rica) who were eager to see an end to the 
corrupt regime.
El Salvador's revolution came about under different 
circumstances than did Nicaragua's. In Nicaragua, as in 
Cuba, the revolution stemmed from rebels' attempts to seize 
control from a dynastic despot. In El Salvador the struggle 
was intended to reform a quasi-democracy which served a 
select oligarchy and continuously propagated leaders from 
the same social and economic class. The guerrillas aimed to 
overthrow the ruling elite and acquire economic benefits for 
the poor. Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas 
began ardently. However, by 1981, the second year of the 
war, the Cuban involvement was restricted to military 
advisors and irregular weapons shipments due to a reduction 
in Soviet financial support for Cuba's activities there..
113 Ibid., 165.
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Although there was no overthrow of the ruling elite, 
the revolution can be categorized as a limited success. By 
1981 the government had initiated political and economic 
reforms designed to aid peasant farmers and workers.114 
Cuban and Soviet support dropped further following an ill- 
fated guerrilla offensive in January 1981. Following the 
guerrilla defeat, the Soviet Union encouraged the small 
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) to move away from 
armed struggle and concentrate on negotiations with the 
ruling government.115 Although Castro openly supported the 
guerrillas, he could not maintain significant levels of 
support without continued Soviet backing.
A major setback to the spread of socialism in Latin 
America occurred when Cuban-Soviet domination was ended in 
Grenada. On October 19, 1983 Maurice Bishop, the communist 
ruler of Grenada and protege of Castro, was killed following 
a coup d'etat. The leaders of the coup were dissatisfied 
members of Bishop's Marxist "New Jewel Movement" who saw 
Bishop's anti-American stance weakening. President Ronald 
Reagan, seeking to ensure the safety of 1,000 Americans on 
the island and promote the formation of a democratic 
government, sent 1,900 troops to the island. The communist 
government was replaced with a democratic system, in which 
the communist factions continue to do battle. The invasion
114 Ibid., 167.
115 Ibid.
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was significant since it revealed that the United States was 
not willing to allow unchecked Soviet expansion in Latin 
America. Castro, not expecting Soviet military retaliation 
against the United States, supported Soviet condemnation of 
the invasion.
Throughout this period, the Soviet Union and Cuba, 
faced with numerous communist struggles throughout the 
world, decided to divide the world into "mini spheres of 
influence.” The Soviets opted to concentrate on crises in 
A?ghanistan (begun in 1979) and Poland (begun in 1981). As 
a result, the Cubans were allowed to conduct their wars in 
Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and assume greater 
control over communist forces in Ethiopia, with relatively 
little Soviet interference. The Cuban success in Nicaragua 
led the Soviet Union to consider more seriously the support 
of armed struggle in Latin America. Scholars, too, began to 
reconsider the guerrilla warfare theories once championed by 
Che Guevara and guerrilla tactics as a recognized route to 
legitimate power lost support.
Although Cuban-Soviet cooperations encouraged new 
socialist states, the financial support to ensure their 
survival was lacking since neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union 
could afford to provide newly established communist regimes 
with the amount of economic assistance they sought to 
rebuild their economies. However, the Soviets were eager to 
reward Cuba for its cooperation in Latin America and Africa
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and provided Castro with increased arms shipments and 
economic assistance, part of which was earmarked for the 
promotion of armed struggle in Latin America.116
116 W. R. Duncan, 173, 177-178.
Chapter Five 
The Gorbachev Era: 1985-Present
Cuban-Soviet relations throughout the first three years 
of the Mikhail Gorbachev era remained secure and relatively 
unchanged. Castro was careful to maintain good relations 
with the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring continued 
military and economic assistance. However, since the 
introduction of political and, more importantly, economic 
reforms within the Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy has 
become subordinated to the more urgent domestic problems 
challenging the stability and unity of the nation. In an 
attempt to revitalize the nation's domestic economy and 
reduce economic assistance to Soviet allies, Gorbachev 
deemed it necessary to reassess the theory and practice of 
past foreign policies. The result was "new thinking," an 
approach which postulates that Soviet policies must be based 
in the long run on reasonable cost/benefit analysis and 
economic accountability, not on the outdated ideological 
formulas that guided past foreign policy.117
The idea of "new thinking" conceptualizes Gorbachev's
117 Jiri Valenta, "'New Thinking' and Soviet Policy in 
Latin America," The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1990), 136- 
137.
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call for radical changes to combat the rising costs and 
decreasing effectiveness of policies initiated under the 
leadership.of Leonid Brezhnev and his predecessors.118 The 
Soviet military buildup and international activism of the 
late 1970s, particularly the invasion and prolonged 
occupation of Afghanistan, backing for the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, and support for other vanguard party regimes, 
depleted Soviet resources and contributed to deepening 
economic and social stagnation in the Soviet Union. This, 
combined with growing Western opposition to Soviet 
international behavior (as demonstrated by U.S. support for 
freedom fighters in Afghanistan and anti-Leninist insurgents 
in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia), prompted Moscow to 
reassess its foreign policy goals and strategies. What 
resulted were policies which were intended to initiate or 
strengthen state-to-state relations based on western 
perceptions of normal international relations, including 
trade, economic assistance, and overt military sales to 
existing governments.
Gorbachev began by deemphasizing ideology as the 
foundation for Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev had defended 
much of his foreign policy, including the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and subseguent issuing of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and 
escalation of the Cold War, with Leninist ideology that
118 Ibid., 136.
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justified all efforts to aid the spread of world socialism. 
Gorbachev sought to reform Soviet foreign policy and promote 
state-to-state relations based on positive economic and 
political cooperation. This would entail the restructuring 
of relations with existing allies.
At first, western scholars and analysts doubted 
Gorbachevs commitment to reshaping the Soviet Union's 
approach to international relations. Similar pronouncements 
of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement and other foreign policy 
reforms by earlier Soviet leaders failed to bring about a 
more stable international situation. Therefore, few 
westerners recognized that "new thinking" was more than 
propaganda and reflected a fundamental change in the Soviet 
Union's perception of its role in world affairs.119
In the first few years of Gorbachev's rule, it appeared
that there was no significant shift in the relations between 
Moscow and Havana. In an address before the Third Congress 
of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in February of that 
year, Castro offered renewed testimony that Cuba remained 
the leading, faithful ally and advocate of the Soviet Union
and its interests. He claimed that his nation had never
before been stronger militarily and would discharge its 
"sacred internationalist duties in accordance with its
119 John Edwin Mroz, "Soviet Foreign Policy and New 
Thinking," International Affairs (Moscow) (May 1990), 23.
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abilities.”120 However, during his report before the 
Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU, shortly after the PCC 
congress, Gorbachev failed to mention the Kremlin's 
traditional pledge of support for "wars of national 
liberation" of the type witnessed,throughout the Third World 
and forcefully advocated by Castro.121 Instead, Gorbachev 
asserted that global problems affecting the way people live 
and the very existence of the planet must carry greater 
urgency and importance than the problems of any one class or 
the promotion of any one ideology.122 He called for 
support for renewed detente with the west, arguing that non­
violence and mutual cooperation would better ensure an 
improved international climate and the future of the Soviet 
Union. He defended his position and refuted the belief, 
maintained by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, that peaceful 
coexistence with imperial, capitalist nations (namely the 
United States and western European nations) was useful only 
as a prolonged tactic to postpone, but not prevent, the 
inevitable confrontation between the capitalist and 
communist worlds.
Gorbachev's failure to pledge support for wars of 
national liberation and his efforts to encourage greater
120 R. Bruce McColm, "Castro's Ambitions Amid New Winds 
from Moscow," Strategic Review (Summer 1986), 48.
121 Ibid., 49.
122 Serg Mikoyan, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Latin 
America," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1990), 180.
socialist cooperation with capitalist nations drew sharp 
criticism from Castro. In 1986 the Cuban Communist Party 
“published a platform paper entitled "Principles and 
Objectives of Foreign Policy.” The paper pledged Castro's 
and the party's abiding support for revolutionary movements 
around the world and vowed to work toward unity among 
diverse forces that are part of the international 
revolutionary process. The paper reiterated Castro's 
internationalist commitment, saying "the [Cuban] party and 
people will continue to fulfill honorably their 
internationalist duties, exercising solidarity with the 
peoples who are struggling for their independence and 
national liberation.”123
Castro's unwillingness to accept Soviet "new thinking" 
may be explained in two ways. First, Castro has always 
maintained that a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement would increase 
the chances of an American invasion of Cuba. As he saw it, 
stronger ties between the Soviet Union and the West would / 
weaken the Soviet commitment to its Third World allies, 
especially Cuba. Although many analysts argue that the 
threat and feasibility of direct American intervention has 
diminished considerably since the 1960s, Castro believes
r
that the U.S. government would welcome any type of coup,
\
whether organized from within Cuba or sponsored by Cuban
123 R. Bruce McColm, "Castro's Ambitions Among New 
Winds from Moscow," Strategic Review (Summer 1986), 48-49.
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exiles in the United States and South America.124 The .
’ ■ ■ .1 i.
second explanation reflects Castro's commitment to the 
revolution and the legitimacy his government derives from | 
that commitment. Support for revolution is a constitutive 
ideological dimension of the Cuban revolution. It validates 
Castro's regime at home and augments his influence 
abroad.125 Violence —  conventional and guerrilla -- has 
been the fuel of his power ^ nd prestige.
By 1987 Gorbachev began to mesh "new thinking" and 
perestroika, Soviet plans for domestic economic reform, by 
calling for significant economic reform, including the 
expansion of trade to include non socialist nations and the 
solicitation of economic assistance and trade credit from 
Western Europe, from its economically dependant allies, 
particularly members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). However, Castro argued that the economic 
reforms associated with perestroika were not a precondition 
for "new thinking" elsewhere than in the Soviet Union. He 
maintained that the acceptance of worker incentive programs 
and market-oriented management of industry would betray the 
people of Cuba. Castro called for "rectification" of the 
Cuban economy —  a return to a more doctrinaire Marxism that 
rejects material incentives as well as profit and private
124 "Castro's Future," Niohtline (ABC News, Show No. 
2298), March 14, 1990, 4-5.
125 J. I. Dominguez, as quoted in R. B. McColm, 50.
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^  Although Castro, was unwilling to accept market reforms 
as proposed by the Soviets, he recognized t:he need for some 
reforms to remedy poor economic planning and bureaucratic 
inefficiency. He agreed to implement certain Soviet-style 
reforms that reflected modernization and economic self- 
discipline, but asserted that he was firmly opposed to the 
mixture of socialism and capitalism since the two systems 
are based on very different approaches to society and 
economics. In December 1986 he argued:
Apparently we [socialists] thought that by 
dressing a person up as a capitalist we were going 
to achieve efficient production in the factory and 
so...we started to play at being capitalists....
When there’s no competition, if the motivation 
prompting the owner in a capitalist society to 
defend his personal interests is out of the 
question, what is there to substitute for this?
Only the cadres' individual sense of 
responsibility, not just the collective's sense of 
responsibility, the role played by the cadres.
The man who is in charge there must be a
126 Michael Kline, "Castro and 'New Thinking' in Latin 
America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
(Spring 1990), 97.
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Communist...A revolutionary!127 
Castro vowed to withstand Soviet warnings to reform the 
Cuban economy, including threats that Gorbachev was planning 
far-reaching and significant cuts in economic and military 
assistance to its socialist allies. Although Castro 
recognized the need to prepare for such cuts in aid, he was 
unable to reconcile Soviet-style reforms and Cuban-style 
Communism. He explained, "We [Cubans] will never renounce 
the glorious title of Socialists and Communists. We have 
hard-working people fully dedicated to the task of dealing 
with problems, dedicated to advancing the Party and the 
Revolution. The Party will not at any time stop being 
called the Communist Party of Cuba."128
By 1987 Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union 
planned to reduce military aid to most allies outside of 
Eastern Europe. Cuban arms imports, which totaled $2.1 
billion in 1985, dropped to $1.8 billion,J.n~,ia87.129 This 
reduction, believed, in part, to be a reaction to Castro's 
negative assessment of shifts in Soviet policy, led some 
analysts to suspect that Gorbachev would resort to economic
127 R. Rabkin, "Implications of the Gorbachev Era for 
Cuban Socialism,” Studies in Comparative Communism (Vol. 23, 
no. 1, Spring 1990), 39.
128 Ron Chepesiuk, "Castro Against the Tide,” The New 
Leader (January 8, 1990), 10.
129 Jan S. Adams, "Change and Continuity in Soviet 
Central American Policy,” Problems of Communism (March-June
1989), 113.
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pressure to bring Castro into conformity with his reforms. 
Gorbachev maintained that these reductions were motivated by 
economic necessity and that changes in Soviet military and 
economic assistance to its allies should not be interpreted 
as signs of displeasure with them.130
During a brief visit to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev 
faced veiled criticism of perestroika and "new thinking” by 
Casbrof but publicly renewed his commitment to Cuba by 
signing a Treaty of Friendship between the two nations. 
However, within months of Gorbachev*s visit to Cuba, Soviet 
deliveries of petroleum and building supplies were delayed 
without any official explanation or apology.131 Castro 
began to speak publicly of a possible decline in economic 
assistance from the Soviet Union. Soviet spokesmen flatly 
denied that the delays were a tactical maneuver to force. 
Castro to reconsider his opposition to Gorbachev's reforms, 
but emphasized that the economic arrangement between Cuba 
and the Soviet Union was not compatible with reforms taking 
place in the Soviet Union and restructuring would be 
necessary.132
Cuba faced the gravest threat to its economy following
130 R. Rabkin, 27-28.
131 Joseph B. Treaster, "Castro Begins to Talk of 
Decline in Crucial Aid from Soviet Union," New York Times 
(July 28, 1989), A2.
132 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Castro's Nightmare," Washington 
Post (February 27, 1990), A23.
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the collapse of the Soviet Union's East European satellites 
and the subsequent breakdown of the CMEA. Most of the 
social progress that Castro provided Cuba was accomplished 
at the cost of enormous foreign debts and reliance on trade 
subsidies secured through Cuba's "most favored nation" 
status within the CMEA. Since 1972, beneficial trade 
agreements with CMEA states have served as insurance against 
Cuban economic collapse. Cuba became excessively dependent 
on "soft" CMEA trade, which was conducted on a barter basis 
rather than in hard currency. But as the Central and East 
European members adopted market-oriented economies, they 
abandoned subsidized trade with Cuba. This left Castro to 
rely even more heavily on Soviet trade subsidies, most of 
which were scheduled to end by 1991.133
Castro's reaction to the collapse of Cuba's subsidized 
trade arrangements was to reaffirm Cuba's commitment to 
socialism. He accepted the right of Eastern European 
nations to shift to market economies and told a gathering of 
international journalists, "If a socialist country wants to 
construct capitalism, then we have to respect this right."
He added, however, that socialism "is [Cuba's] policy and 
there can be no other way? history makes it so."134
It is clear that Gorbachev's policy changes are not
133 Eugene Robinson, "Castro: Let World Change, Cuba 
Will Stay the Course," Washington Post (March 17, 1990),
A21.
134 Ibid., Al.
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intended to imperil the Soviet Union*s relationships with 
Cuba, or any other nation. The Soviets desire continued 
positive relations with Cuba and other traditional allies, 
but are convinced that significant political and economic 
restructuring within the Soviet Union, as well as stronger 
ties with non-traditional allies, is necessary to the 
maintenance of Soviet socialism. It is unintended 
concurrence, however, that these changes are altering, and 
often jeopardizing, the influence of the Soviet Union over 
its allies. Such is the case with Cuba.
The Soviet Union truly desires to keep Cuba within its 
camp. The relationship which former Soviet leaders built 
with Castro continues to serve the objectives of the Soviet 
Union today.135 Militarily, Cuba provides the Soviets with 
an electronic surveillance base at Lourdes for the 
collection of intelligence data, it provides a military air 
base from which the Soviet Union can launch reconnaissance 
flights along the eastern shores of the United States, and 
it allows for Soviet naval use of the shipyards at 
Cienfuegos. In addition Cuba, which enjoys a popular 
socialist government and health and human services that 
surpass those of other developing nations, has long 
represented the potential positive aspects of socialism to 
Latin American and other Third World nations.
Although the Soviets are encouraging Cuba to adapt to
135 R. Rabkin, 24.
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changing conditions in (and benefits from) the Soviet Union, 
Castro does not view the Soviet model as compatible with 
Cuba's economic strategy. His most frequent argument 
against reforms proposed by the Soviets is that the 
introduction of limited market-oriented mechanisms to Cuba's 
socialist economy would undermine the progress of the Cuban 
Revolution. However, he faces the realization that reforms 
in the Soviet Union are also likely to have an impact on 
Cuba, its economy, and, eventually, the success of the 
revolution.
Castro fears that a sustained decline in Soviet 
military aid to Cuba threatens the unity of Cuba's military 
and its ability to defend itself from U.S. intervention, a 
more feasible threat if Cuba's defenses are compromised as a 
result of cuts in military aid. Following the recent 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola after a year of 
military stalemate, morale is low. If Castro cannot secure 
continued funding or employment for his returning troops, 
once content officers may try to overthrow the current order 
and stability.136
Castro, however, continues to promote the old-line 
ideas and rhetoric, including the offering of encouragement 
to the remaining socialist movements throughout Latin 
America. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union's 
Eastern European satellites, Castro initiated a new wave of
136 R. B. McColm, 53-54.
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veiled anti-Soviet rhetoric. He argued, "the crisis in the 
Soviet bloc was the result of a long-term imperialist 
strategy of undermining socialism from within, compounded by 
'some errors* that may have been committed.1,137
The Cuban response to Soviet calls for economic and 
political reforms has been to turn a deaf ear. The Soviets, 
concerned with the increasing economic and political 
problems within their own borders, have responded with 
gentle persuasion and continued cuts in military assistance. 
There has been a clear and seemingly irreparable ideological 
rift in Cuban-Soviet relations. However, the Soviet Union 
cannot be expected to maintain Castro as a relic of 
communism. Gorbachev must concentrate on the reform of his 
own nation*s economy. Soon he will be forced to make 
drastic cuts in Soviet economic aid to Cuba. While this 
could endanger Cuban-Soviet relations, it must be realized 
that Gorbachev fundamental role as president is to ensure 
and protect the survival of the Soviet Union. Although Cuba 
is a beneficial ally, the need to stabilize the Soviet 
economy outweighs the need to maintain a strong network of 
allies which serves only the expansionist policies of the 
Soviet Union. Gorbachev*s 'new thinking* defines the 
survival of the nation as the driving force of Soviet 
foreign policy.
Although Castro’s popularity within Cuba leads many
137 G. Black, 4.
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analysts to believe that he could easily win a free 
election, he cannot justify reforms which would directly 
conflict with his actions as leader of the revolution. He 
has enjoyed over thirty years as the leading voice of 
communism in the Third World with Soviet backing. In many 
ways, the loosening of bonds with the Soviets allows Castro 
to move forward with his dream to prove himself as the 
leading independent spokesman for communism in the Third 
World. If Cuba were to follow the path of reforms to the 
extent witnessed in Eastern Europe, it would indicate to the 
Cuban people that Castro was abandoning the revolution and 
socialist ideals which served to legitime his rule since 
1959. And it seems doubtful that Castro, who clings to the 
now somewhat fading image of his revolution, will be able to 
make the visionary, but risky, leap into the reality of 'new 
thinking' and embark on a domestic reform, like the Soviets, 
to improve Cuba's image and ensure its role as a leader 
among developing nations.
Conclusion
The previous review of Cuban-Soviet relations since 
1959 clearly demonstrates the close alliance that developed 
between the two nations and left Cuba economically and 
militarily dependant on Soviet support. However, this 
dependance was a calculated risk which Castro was willing to 
take in order to ensure the physical security of his nation, 
the success of his government's social programs, and the 
promotion of Cuba as an influential actor in international 
politics. And despite the many just criticisms charged 
against Castro's regime, including human rights violations, 
deception and censorship, and international terrorism, it 
has succeeded at providing the nation with security and 
relative comfort at home and an influential voice as the 
most enduring socialist nation in the Third World.
Although Cuba historically was seen as vulnerable to 
U.S. military and economic aggression, Castro used close 
ties with the Soviet Union to secure political and economic 
independence from the United States. With massive Soviet 
assistance, genuine socio-economic and political 
accomplishments have been achieved, including a highly 
egalitarian redistribution of income, major advances in the
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areas of education and technical training, and the 
establishment of a national health care system superior to 
similar programs in most developed nations. Castro's 
alliance with the Soviet Union and international communism 
has afforded Cuba a disproportionate amount of world 
attention and influence for a nation of its size and limited 
resources. And although Castro has tolerated Soviet 
interference in many areas of its econpmic and political 
affairs, Cuban "internationalism" has regularly reflected 
the government's commitment to maintaining a foreign policy 
independent of Soviet domination.
Because of Cuba's economlc_and_jmilitary dependence, on 
the Soviet Union, scholars and analysts have tended to 
overemphasize the degree of leverage the Soviet Union exerts 
over Cuba. Both the "Sovietization of Cuba Thesis" and the 
'?Surrogate Thesis" contend that by allowing Cuba to become 
dependent upon Soviet assistance, Castro forfeited his 
nation's autonomy and made Cuba a surrogate of Soviet 
directives. I argue that each of these theses neglects the 
frequent divergence between Cuban and Soviet policies 
regarding key issues. Similarly, the theses fail to 
consider that Castro's willingness to conform with Soviet 
policy in other areas could simply be the result of balanced 
and informed consideration of his government's options.
Cuba is clearly a friendly ally of the Soviet Union and it 
is to be expected that such allies will attempt to
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coordinate policy on important issues. Although the Soviet 
Union has used its economic and military assistance to Cuba 
to exert influence over Castro's government, I allege that 
Cuban-Soviet relations exemplify those of two nations 
pursuing compatible interests.
Proven cases of assertive or coercive power by the 
Soviet Union over Castro are rare. One clear example, 
detailed in chapter two, occurred in 1967-68 when the 
Soviets cut back oil supplies to Cuba in an attempt to 
coerce Castro to suspend his emphasis on armed struggle in 
the Third World. But even then, what compelled the Cubans 
to shift to the pro-Soviet line of peaceful change was a 
number of other domestic and regional forces, including the 
death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, the lack of success among 
Latin American guerrilla movements, and increasing problems 
with production and workers' strife in Cuba.138 Therefore, 
it would be inaccurate to portray Soviet sanctions against 
Cuba as the only factor contributing to Castro's change of 
policy.
The "Sovietization Thesis'* points to Cuba's membership 
in the CMEA and Castro's willingness to restructure the 
nation's economic institutions to parallel those of the 
Soviet Union as examples of the Soviets exerting undue 
influence over Cuba. It maintains that such moves furnished 
the Soviet Union with exorbitant leverage with which it
138 W. R. Duncan, 191.
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could control the Cuban economy and pressure Castro to 
conform with Soviet policies. However, it cannot be ignored 
that Castro actively pursued membership in the CMEA and was 
fully aware of the potential risks and benefits from 
economic restructuring. The arrangement formalized Cuban 
trade with the Soviet Union and other CMEA member states, 
thereby ensuring stable markets for Cuban exports and 
providing continued supplies of necessary imports. During 
the first decade of Cuban membership in the CMEA, trade with 
socialist nations rose considerably from 65.2 percent in 
1974 to 87 percent by 1984.139
The central premise of the "Sovietization Thesis” is 
that the relationship between Castro's Cuba and the Soviet 
Union resembles the relationship that existed between pre- 
revolutionary Cuba and the United States. Before the 
revolution, Cuba's relationship with the United States was 
characterized by an era of U.S. imperialism followed by an 
era of U.S. hegemony.140 From 1898, the year Spain ceded 
Cuba to the United States, to 1934, the year the Platt 
Amendment was abrogated, the U.S. maintained control over 
political and economic developments in Cuba. During these 
years, the United States directed the actions of the Cuban 
government and readily seized control of the government and
139 Frank T. Fitzgerald, "The 'Sovietization of Cuba 
Thesis' Revisited,” Science and Society (Vol. 51, no. 4, 
Winter 1987-1988), 443.
140 J. I. Dominguez, 8.
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occupied the island when U.S. directives were not followed. 
Once Cuba had been molded to serve American interests, the 
Platt Amendment was repealed and the U.S. sought only to 
ensure the security of the island and protect U.S. firms 
doing business there. Trade between the two nations was 
normal and, although the U.S. maintained Naval bases on the 
island, no measures were taken to establish an unusually 
large American military presence on Cuba. However, Cuban 
foreign policy up to the revolution was always expected to 
conform with U.S. interests in the region.
The relationship between Castro’s Cuba and the Soviet 
Union is very different. The "Sovietization Thesis" assumes 
rather than demonstrates the existence of Soviet coercion. 
Since the establishment of political and economic ties, 
Castro has enjoyed considerable independence from Soviet 
pressure and has frequently pursued policies which directly 
conflicted with Soviet aims. There is reason to believe 
that the Cubans maintain considerable leverage in their 
dealings with the Soviets and that the Cuban-Soviet 
relationship is one of negotiated give and take.141 For 
example, Cuba was able to solicit overt Soviet support for 
its activities in Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, 
despite the Soviet Union’s official curtailment of such 
support. The results of Cuba's intervention in Africa and 
the success of the Cuban-backed Sandinistas in El Salvador
141 - F. T. Fitzgerald, 447.
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influenced the Soviet Union to moderate temporarily its 
opposition to armed struggle. Because of his significant 
leverage in the Nonaligned Movement, Castro has acquired the 
unofficial role of Soviet spokesman to the Third World, 
particularly to Latin America. However, Cuba's sacrifices^ 
to ensure economic stability and a strong voice in the 
socialist world have proven costly, if not detrimental.
Cuba's failure to establish economic relations with 
most non-CMEA nations has left the island vulnerable to 
financial ruin as a result of the collapse of CMEA trade and 
the announcement by the Soviets of cuts in military and 
economic assistance to dependant allies. These events along 
with Castro's frequent criticism of Gorbachev's reform 
policies, have led many analysts to predict an end to 
friendly relations between the two nations. They argue that 
the two approaches to socialism are no longer reconcilable 
and, without the benefits of Soviet economic assistance, 
Castro has no incentive to accommodate Gorbachev's 'new 
thinking.' However, even if the Soviet Union were to cut 
off completely economic assistance to Cuba, Castro could 
continue to profit from its relationship with the Soviet 
Union.
Because Cuba had focused its foreign economic policy on 
subsidized trade with CMEA nations, the Soviet Union remains 
one of the few nations with which it can be assured of 
continued trade, albeit on less favorable terms. Gorbachev
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has vowed to provide Cuba with $450 million in aid and hard 
currency loans to see it through the immediate crisis.142 
If Castro is willing to accept economic relations with 
capitalist nations, a key tenet of 'new thinking,* then the 
Soviets would conceivably seek to maintain Cuba's economic 
viability thus far by continuing to provide Castro with 
technical assistance and economic advisors. More 
importantly, expanded trade with capitalist nations could 
help to safeguard Cuba's educational, health, and welfare 
systems, the success of which fosters public support for 
Castro's regime.
Acceptance of "new thinking" could also serve to 
preserve Castro's influence abroad, influence which he 
derives from Cuba's unique relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Cuban foreign policy has as its goals "to hold power 
and leverage in the international system, to remain 
independent of the United States, to support insurgencies, 
and to promote diplomatic relations."143 According to 
Michael Kline and other scholars, none of these goals, 
including support for insurgencies, is necessarily 
inconsistent with 'new thinking.1144 In recent years 
Castro has been willing to use diplomatic measures to pursue
142 M. Kline, 100.
143 Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy; Caribbean 
Tempest (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1986), 25.
144 M. Kline, 103.
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many of Cuba*s foreign policy aims, including the 
undermining of U.S. economic and political pressure against 
Cuba. A recent example of this policy occurred in 1989 when 
Cuba garnered the support of Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, 
Peru, and Mexico to defeat a U.S.-sponsored resolution in 
the United Nations condemning Cuba for human rights 
violations.145 Castro*s declaration in January 1989 
insisted that "there should be no doubt whatsoever that we 
fully support the Soviet Union's peace policy."146
Although Soviet Union is willing to sacrifice its 
relationship with Cuba if Cuban-Soviet relations threaten to 
jeopardize "new thinking," it too stands to lose many 
benefits. Cuba continues to serve as the Soviet Union's 
primary bridge to the Third World. It serves as an example 
of a nation that willingly adopted and preserved socialism 
and Marxist-Leninist teachings. And it acts as a base of 
support for future communist movements in Latin America.
More practically, Soviet bases and intelligence 
installations on Cuba would be irreplaceable due to the 
island's strategic location. Because of these benefits, it 
is feasible that the Soviet Union will work to retain Cuba 
as a socialist ally and would make whatever concessions are 
economically possible to keep Cuba as an eager defender of 
Soviet policies.
145 M. Kline, 104.
146 Ibid, 104-105.
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As has been reflected throughout the history of Cuban- 
Soviet relations, any solution to this conflict will 
necessitate compromise by both sides. Each nation has 
benefitted from the relationship and each stands to lose 
considerable interests if the alliance folds. It is 
plausible that, in order to preserve stability at home and 
influence abroad, Castro will accept changes in Soviet 
policy while asserting his traditional brand of communism 
and beliefs. In return, the Soviets will promise to honor 
its military alliance with Cuba and work to maintain limited 
economic assistance and trade agreements that benefit Cuba. 
These actions will allow each nation to safeguard 
traditional benefits while independently pursuing better 
relations with other nations.
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